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The Museum for the Macedonian Struggle

"Macedonia's Name: Breaking the Deadlock"

Evangelos Kofos

Περιοδική Έκδοση Μακεδονικών Σπουδών

Έκδοση του Αυστραλιανού Ινστιτούτου Μακεδονικών Σπουδών
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"Aetolos, Akarnanas, Makedonas ejusdem linguae homines"
(T. Livius)

Editorial

FYROM's irredentism, expansionism and secessionism

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia came into existence in 1991. This newly emerging state was not a country that was recreated after centuries, nor one which, having been destroyed or absorbed by others over the years, was once again restructured and reappeared, as was the case with Chechoslovakia, Israel or Palestine. As a matter of fact, there was never a country or a state bearing the name "Macedonia", only the geographic region of ancient Macedonia, a region affiliated and interconnected with the history, language, civilization, culture and religion of Ancient Hellas. In 146 BC, the Romans, wishing to eradicate the Hellenic identity of the Macedonians, created a large dominion extending the ancient borders of Macedonia (*see relevant paper in this edition of the MS*), and calling the new territory *Macedonia Prima* (*Provincia Macedoniae*). When Roman General Quintus Caecilius Metellus defeated Andriscus of Macedon, Rome established a new province incorporating ancient Macedonia, which also included Epirus, Thessaly, and parts of Illyria, Paionia and Thrace. This created a much larger administrative area, to which the name of Macedonia was still applied. Hence, any sort or type of national irredentism regarding the name "Macedonia" as an ethnic or national nomenclature is anthropologically pseudonymous and politically irrational.

Irredentism is the nationalist belief that a territory belonging to another country should be annexed for ethnic or historical reasons. Irredentist claims are usually justified on the basis that the irredentists' ethnic group, now or historically, formed the majority in that territory or that the territory was part of the irredentists' nation-state at some point in the past. In the case of the people of FYROM, the Macedoslavs, who try to emerge unilaterally as the "Macedonians", nothing of the above is validated. The constitutional name of "Macedonia" that they were inspired to use for their country was never a territory exclusively or primarily or historically occupied by "Macedonians"; "Macedonians" never formed the majority in this territory and most importantly this region was never the nation-state of the "Macedonians."

Furthermore, irredentism is to be distinguished from territorial expansionism, in that irredentism claims to advocate taking back land that is "rightfully ours," while expansionism advocates annexation regardless of whether the territory was "ours" in the first place. Hence, the actual mode of irrational behaviour of the Macedoslavs should be called *expansionism* and not just irredentism in the Balkans; a tendency which inflames ethnic and national unrest and creates instability to the wider European community. The name of the hypothetical country resulting from successful annexation frequently contains the word "Greater", such as, for example, in Greater Serbia, Greater Albania, or Greater Russia, as we have recently experienced with the annexation of Crimea.

Then there comes the third means of nationalism: *secessionism*. The scholarship on irredentism and secessionism suggests that the former is more likely to become violent and result in war than the latter. Irredentist conflicts are often instigated by sovereign states, whereas, secessionist conflicts are usually initiated by minority groups. Since sovereign states have military capability to fight full-scale wars, irredentist conflicts tend to be more violent and/or turn international. Given that minority groups lack military resources to fight for their causes, secessionist conflicts on the other hand normally do not escalate to interstate war. However, what happens if a sovereign state with a full-fledged army decides

to support a secessionist cause? We refer our readers to the Ukraine experience and the prolonged civil war there.

Since 2006, the Macedoslavs of FYROM, via their ultra-nationalist government of Nikola Gruevski and its agencies have attempted to implement within their new national borders and in the Macedoslavic Diaspora **all three expressions of nationalism, namely irredentism, expansionism and secessionism**, thus acting as a serious source of instability in the Balkans and the greater European community. They preach **irredentism** by posing as “Macedonians” when they never historically formed the majority in Macedonia or Macedonia Prima. In their delirious nationalism they masquerade their Macedoslavic identity and adulterate their culture with Hellenic statues and Greek cultural monuments belonging to another nation-country, namely Hellas, simply to pose as ancient Macedonians. Hence, they demonstrate disrespect and betray their own renowned Slavic culture and civilization. They preach **expansionism** infiltrating the conscience of the few thousands of Greek bilingual citizens in Ancient Macedonia, the birthplace of Alexander the Great and Aristotle, a region in which they desire to find their “enslaved compatriots”, the *Egejski Makedonci*. Finally they preach **secessionism** both within their national borders as well as in the Diaspora via their propaganda machine, their consular staff and their publications producing maps of the Greater Macedonia.

Historically, there have been many territories that have changed hands very often, and territories in which the ethnic composition has changed over time. This means the claims of different irredentist movements of what is “rightfully theirs” very often overlap. Since the borders of nearly all nations have changed over time, irredentist attitudes can be found in most parts of the world. Usually, they are part of nationalist ideologies, though by far not all nationalist ideologies and groups include them. Fortunately, irredentism usually does not receive the official support it once did.

The Gruevski government constitutes an extreme form of irredentism, expansionism and secessionism, seeking to expand its newly emerged country to a maximum extent, regardless of whether the Macedoslavs ever actually formed the majority in the territory in question. The government of FYROM should be reminded that similar expressions of nationalism, expansionism and secessionism are also displayed by other ethnicities within its national borders. According to the *Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010* report, the idea of a Greater Albania is supported by the majority of Albanians in Albania (63%), Kosovo (81%) and the Republic of “Macedonia” (53%). This clearly demonstrates that it would be more prudent to safeguard the welfare of the Macedoslav people, build constructive relations with neighbouring countries, reinforce the social cohesion of citizens rather than waste the country’s human and material resources to chase ghosts and imagined enemies in the south.

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The quai of Thessaloniki, place of trade activities, political discussions, and military action.

All WWI photos in this issue derive from the Archive of the Museum for the Macedonian Struggle Foundation, unless otherwise stated.

Macedonia in the Great War (1914-1918)*

Loukianos Hassiotis
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The First World War of 1914-1918 -“the Great War to end all wars”- was a period of great importance for Greek Macedonia, a time of dramatic political and military events. Foreign armies fought over its territory, with Greece remaining a neutral at the outset, and cast envious eyes at the possibility of controlling it politically. There was besides the Greek “National Schism”, the split between the supporters of the Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and those of King Constantine, formalized by the setting up of a provisional government in Salonica. In September 1918 the Allies made a great drive into Macedonia, with the Greek army now taking part, the Macedonian Front of the Germans was at last broken, and the outcome of the war was no longer in doubt. At this same period Macedonia was in what may be called a transitional state. No longer was it a multiracial province, but it had been transformed into an ethnically fairly homogeneous area, as a result of population movements during and immediately after the Great War. Conditions in Macedonia -demographic, social, economic, and political- were described by contemporary observers, Greeks and foreigners, from their various standpoints. It was particularly the foreign observers, the soldiers, diplomats, commercial representatives, journalists, secret agents, and so on, who would leave posterity a valuable picture of Macedonia at this time. Their productions include memoirs, sketches, and even documentary films. But most typical of all were their photographs, which were legion, and many of which can be seen in the form of postcards that made Salonica and its environs familiar throughout the world. This made the Macedonia of the Great War one of the most thoroughly photographed subjects in Greek history, and in European history for that matter.

Macedonia on the eve of the Great War

After the Balkan Wars, Macedonia, which had already in the mid nineteenth century become an international apple of discord and the scene of political unrest and clashes between different nationalities, eventually obtained a new status. For what had once been an Ottoman province was now partitioned between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. This development was made official by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, and it was wholly reliant on an alliance between Greece and Serbia, with the approval of Rumania. This had as its object to limit Bulgarian expansionism and to maintain the balance of power in the Balkans. It was not to be. From the very start it was Greece which did best out of the Balkan Wars. She had won the larger part of Macedonia, and she had the lion’s share of the Greek-speaking (or at least Greek-minded) population in the region, its biggest towns, and its ports, which of course meant above all Salonica. But the absorption of Macedonia into the kingdom of

* First published in the Museum for the Macedonian Struggle 2007 Calendar.

Greece was not without its problems. The inhabitants of these “new territories” were very mixed, from the point of view of ethnicity and religion. In the city of Salonica itself, the Greek element was in no higher than third place, with 25% of the population, fewer than the large Jewish community (39%) or the Muslim population (29%). On a number of occasions the Greek administration showed that it was in no position to deal with something that it was encountering for the first time - the multiethnic nature of the region. It was also obliged to take account of the policies of the Great Powers, with their major economic and political interests at Salonica. Even though the situation appeared to have been normalized quite quickly, with the outbreak of the First World War everything was once more thrown into confusion and the Macedonian Question became a main item on the agenda of diplomats.

The Macedonian Front

The First World War started when the hostilities were formally declared in August



Preparing meal in open air in the allied camp at Zeitenlik, Thessaloniki.

1914, with the invasion of Serbia by Austro-Hungary. Within a short time all the Great Powers of Europe were involved in the conflict as a consequence of their alliances and obligations. The Central Powers -the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Germany- stood on one side, and on the other were the Allies of the Entente - France, Great Britain, and Russia. It was not long before the Ottoman Empire threw in its lot with the Central Powers, followed by Bulgaria. In October 1915 there was a drive into Serbia by the combined armies of Austria,

Germany and Bulgaria, and Serbia’s army, her government and much of her civilian population were forced to withdraw and seek refuge on Greek soil. It was at the same period that Allied troops landed at Salonica to stiffen Serbian resistance. The landing was with the tacit consent of Eleftherios Venizelos, who was in favour of Greece coming into the war on the side of the Allies. It was however opposed by the Greek King Constantine, who had ties of blood and sentiment with Germany and whose wish was Greece to remain neutral. The conflict between Venizelos and the King, which is known as the “National Schism”, was temporarily won by Constantine. Greece now found herself in the strange position of maintaining neutrality as the two foreign armies opposed one another on Greek soil. This was the making of the “Macedonian Front”, where a coalition of troops from Britain, France, Serbia, Russia, Italy and, in the end, Greece, faced the forces of Austro-Hungary, Germany and Bulgaria.

Foreign propaganda and espionage

There was a sharp increase in foreign propaganda to the detriment of Greek sovereignty in Macedonia after the Macedonian Front had been formed and in the wake of Greece's domestic crisis. It was not only, and not even mainly, from the traditional claimant to Macedonia, Bulgaria, that this propaganda campaign emanated. In the years from 1915 to 1918 Serbian, French and Italian agencies were all hard at it. These agencies did not necessarily represent the official policy of their respective countries, for there is good evidence to show that the propaganda was sometimes in conflict with the "party line". At all events, what they made out was that there was a lack of control on the part of the Greek state; and it is indeed true that Greek sovereignty at Salonica was in a state of disarray in at least the first years of the Macedonian Front. Successive governments in Athens, under the thumb of King Constantine, blamed the situation on the French commander-in-chief of the Allied forces, General Maurice Sarrail, who had assumed de facto administrative powers over the region, in disregard of the Greek authorities. The Allies reciprocally accused Athens of hindering them in their work and of leaking information about their dispositions to the Germans. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter, the truth is that at that period Salonica had become a nest of spies, to quote the title of a later film, thanks to the presence of foreign troops and the bizarre situation caused by "parallel administration" by the Greek and Allied authorities.



The French Commander of the Army of the Orient, General Maurice Sarrail, Thessaloniki 1916.

The Bulgarian invasion

After occupying Serbia, the onward drive by the German and Bulgarian forces halted at the Greek frontiers, since Greece was still neutral and Germany had no intention of precipitating its entry into the war. The Allies were too weak to unleash a counterattack, so that they had to stay on the defensive, in an "entrenched camp", as their enemies ironically called it. There was no change on the front until May 1916. Then the Bulgarian and German armies invaded, and seized the border fortress of Roupel, in eastern Macedonia, very probably with the connivance of Constantine. In the course of that summer the Bulgarian army was able, unopposed, to occupy eastern Macedonia and the city of Kavalla, where virtually the entire Fourth Greek Army Corps surrendered, on orders from Athens, and was taken off to Görlitz in Germany. However, the Bulgarian drive in west Macedonia was less successful, for it was cut short by a French and Serbian counterattack. Relations between Constantine and the Entente degenerated rapidly after the surrendering of eastern Macedonia. The Allies assumed control of Greek ports, and demanded the disbanding of the Greek army, which they now saw as potentially hostile. General Sarrail declared a state of emergency in Salonica. He confined the remaining Greek troops to barracks and gave orders that their

lines of defence should be taken over by Allied forces. But the most important thing about the Bulgarian invasion was that it for the most part shattered public morale. Greeks watched with dismay as the lands that had been won in the Balkan Wars were lost again. It was these perilous developments which hastened the emergence of the National Defence movement.

The provisional government in Salonica

The threat of national disaster in Macedonia in the wake of the Bulgarian invasion was enough to persuade the Venizelist officers of the National Defence -a body that had been formed in Salonica in December 1915- to bring forward the date for making their movement public. At the start of their activities they had not found much support among the officers and troops stationed in Salonica, who were for the most part steadfastly of royalist sympathies. In the event their success was due to intervention by the French, who disarmed any unit refusing to join the movement. After some initial misgivings, Venizelos agreed to undertake the leadership of the movement. Taking up residence in Salonica, he formed a provisional government. He himself was at the head of what was immediately



Men of the Cretan Gendarmerie of Thessaloniki present arms to Eleftherios Venizelos.

nicknamed “the triumvirate”, with Admiral Pavlos Kountouriotis and General Panagiotis Danglis as the other two members. At the very outset the provisional government found itself having to face complex problems. Not only did the Allies, unwilling to completely break off relations with Athens, refuse to acknowledge it officially; they did not give it sufficient financial support. The government likewise met with difficulties in its attempted campaign into the hinterland of Macedonia, because local populations had no stomach for the fight. The provisional government went ahead anyway, and

took various important steps of an institutional nature, even if many of their resolutions were not in the end implemented. One was to introduce the use of vernacular spoken and written Greek (“demotic”) in primary schools. Another was to transfer the ownership of farm estates (“chiftlics”) in order to set landless farmers on their feet. There were also the drawing up of an ecclesiastical charter for the “new territories”, the founding of a Labour Centre in Salonica itself, and so on and so forth. The provisional government reached the end of its existence in June 1917, when Constantine abdicated in favour of his second son Alexander, and Venizelos returned in triumph to Athens, to become prime minister and assume the leadership of the country as a whole.

Salonica during the Great War

The years of the Great War were to see the last flash of Salonica's brilliance as a cosmopolitan, multiethnic city. It had already been the home of a mixture of cultures, but now was swollen by refugees and by thousands of foreign soldiers, of unfamiliar speech and race. Among them were many Africans and Asians, serving with the British and French colonial regiments. Though their arrival more than doubled the number of inhabitants, causing serious problems of provisioning, billeting, and transport for vehicles, pedestrians and livestock, its overall effect was to pump up the city's economic life, with the construction of military works providing employment for refugees and for men who were out of work. Trade gave badly needed relief to businesses that had been hard hit by previous wars, but it also meant that the price of goods and accommodation soared. Despite the fact that by the end of 1917 there was a serious shortage of foodstuffs and other goods, mortality among the population fell significantly, because of the hygiene measures taken by the Allied staffs. What had once been an Ottoman provincial capital was transformed into a European metropolis, with cafés-chantant, picture palaces, orchestras, cabarets, and a social whirl such as it had never seen before. At Zeitenlik, on the western outskirts of the city, in what was the biggest of the Allies' encampments, there were frequent shows and entertainments that tickled the curiosity of the local people. On the eastern outskirts, beyond the Cemeteries and the villas of the well-to-do middle classes, aerodromes and military hospitals were built. Foreign soldiers took photographs, and sometimes even filmed, whatever came into view, thus recording the look of a city that was changing rapidly, and preserving for posterity the image of its buildings, quarters, and public monuments, many of which were later to be destroyed.

Daily life in the Macedonian countryside



French soldiers and villagers standing among corn husks.

Wartime brought the Macedonian countryside many hardships, but at the same time many benefits. It was rural people, especially those not very far from the battle front, who bore the brunt of enemy action. Many of them were forced to abandon their homes, either by the fighting itself or by the inexorable advance of the Bulgarian invaders. There were certainly some advantages to the inhabitants of Macedonia from having the Allies present and active on their lands. One was the intensive programme of public works. Intended primarily for military use, these not only provided many people with work, but they simultaneously improved the road and rail network in the region. Then there was the fight against malaria. Alarmed by the incidence of this disease among their troops, the Allies were not slow to take measures to eradicate it. New canals were built; marshes were drained or hosed with paraffin; and large quantities of quinine were distributed to non-combatant local people as well as to the soldiers. Food shortages led to partial modernization of agricultural produc-

tion and to the setting up of agricultural colleges in order to train farmers in the new methods. As at Salonica, there was a boom in economic activity. The Allies' needs were the cue for many merchants, craftsmen and factory owners to exploit the situation by stepping up productivity and increasing their profits. Contact with troops from abroad meant that new ideas caught on among the local population. And there were even "mixed marriages" between Macedonian women and foreign soldiers.

The great fire of 1917

Wartime Salonica saw one major civilian event that was to have enormous consequences for the city and its development. This was the great fire of August 1917, which destroyed perhaps two thirds of the city's centre. Various conspiracy theories went the rounds about how it had started, both at the time and in later years. But it does seem to have been a genuine accident. The truest causes of this great disaster should be sought in the city's cramped streets and alleys, the high summer temperatures, and the inability of the Fire Brigade to get the fire quickly under control. Within a few days 120 hectares of the city's old centre had been reduced to ashes, leaving seventy thousand of its inhabitants homeless, and also obliterating its traditional appearance and street pattern. The great fire was a fearsome catastrophe for Salonica's inhabitants, and it caused terrible housing problems that were only made worse by the influx of foreign soldiery and refugees. But at the same time, it was a great opportunity to rebuild what had been an Ottoman city on a European model. The Venizelos government acted at once to start the rebuilding, by setting up, in the days that followed, a joint Greek, British and French design committee headed by a French architect, Ernest Hébrard. His plan called for the construction of broad avenues, as in Paris, galleries of shops, houses for workers, and city centre buildings that had a distinctly Byzantine flavor still to be seen in the Plateia Aristotelous in the heart of Thessaloniki. Hébrard's intentions were never fully realized, however. There were various reasons for this: frequent changes of government, pressure from private owners and builders, and also the urgent immediate necessities to which were due further events, the chief of which was a housing crisis when refugees started to arrive from Asia Minor in 1922.

Newspapers in Salonica

Even before the Macedonian Front came into being, there were a fair number of newspapers in circulation at Salonica, in various languages. But the period from 1915 to the end of the decade was to be one of unparalleled success for the local press, with twenty or so wartime newspapers and periodicals appearing in the city, in seven different languages - Greek, Turkish, French, English, Russian, Italian and Serbian. They had what was, for the time and place, an impressive print run. In 1917, for instance, the readership of the three newspapers in French - *L'Independant*, *Echo de France* and *Paris-Balkans* - reached 18,000, 7,000 and 6,000 respectively. The celebrated British organ *Balkan News* had a readership of no fewer than 25,000, the Tsarist *Ruski Vestnik* 3,000, and the *Voce d' Italia* another 2,000. Nor was the domestic Greek industry far behind. The *Macedonia*, still with us, had a print run of 5,000, *Nea Aletheia* of 4,000, and *Phos* and *Hellas* of 2,500 each. Then there were the newly-established newssheets, some published by refugees from the Bul-

garian-occupied zones or the Ottoman Empire (for example the *Semaia* [Flag] from Kavalla and the *Neologos* from Constantinople), others by republicans in hiding at Salonica (for example *Rizospastis* [The Radical], the *Ephemeris ton Balkanion* and *I Pali* [The Political Struggle]). Salonica's dailies and periodicals had to cope with the fact of military censorship by the Allied and the Greek authorities, a censorship which was due not only to the war situation but to the domestic crisis within Greece. They were also one of the major propaganda weapons in the war, with the two opposite camps each endeavouring, frequently by buying out or coercing an interest to get the city's newspapers on their side.

How the Front was broken

After the Bulgarian invasion in the summer of 1916, all was quiet on the Macedonian Front. It was not until the start of 1918, when a new commander, a Frenchman named Louis Guillaumat, came to take over the Allied troops, that the decision was taken to launch



Greek soldiers escorting away Bulgarian prisoners.

a new attack. It was at the start of 1918, too, that the Greek contingent started to pull its weight. This was because Venizelos had returned to power and war had been declared by Greece against the Central Powers. With the added numbers of the Greek army, the Allies were now able to carry out a series of local assaults during April, May and June 1918, the Greeks distinguishing themselves in the battles at the river Strymon and at Skra. Guillaumat's replacement, Louis Franchet d'Esperey, at once began preparations for the great Allied assault that was to break

the Macedonian Front. The attack was launched in the vicinity of Dobropol by French and Serbian divisions on 15th September. After a few days, the Allied troops had successfully broken through the Bulgarian lines of defence. The bulk of the Bulgarian army was able to avoid encirclement by beating an orderly retreat, but its soldiers now found themselves confronted with popular uprisings in the homeland itself. Realizing that it could no longer continue the war, the Bulgarian government came to terms. By the treaty signed on 30th September 1918, Bulgaria was obliged



German and Bulgarian soldiers at Fort Rupel following its surrendering.

immediately to evacuate all the Serbian and Greek territory it occupied; to disband almost the whole of its army; and to permit the Allies to take over strategic points in the country. The War in Macedonia was at an end. The part played by Greece in the European conflict had in the ends strengthened her reliability in the eyes of the Entente. The sacrifices which the country had made, and her rise to become a power in the region at large led to the definite incorporation of Western Thrace into Greek territory and the provisional cession of Eastern Thrace and Western Asia Minor. The ultimate fate of these lands was to be decided only later, and in the most dramatic manner, for Hellenism.


Refugees and forcibly displaced persons

Population movements in Macedonia, whether voluntary or forced, had already begun at the time of the Balkan Wars, and they were to continue almost unabated throughout the First World War. Even before the Macedonian Front had been formed, upwards of seventy thousand Greek refugees from eastern Thrace and Asia Minor sought shelter in Greek Macedonia, to escape the pogrom which the Young Turks had unleashed against them. Macedonia was likewise the destination of refuge for thirty thousand Greeks from what was at the time Bulgarian western Thrace. There were moreover the Serbian refugees, thousands of whom arrived in Greek Macedonia after Serbia had been occupied by the Central Powers in 1915, remaining there to the very end of the war. In 1916 some thirty thousand Greeks from eastern Macedonia were forcibly displaced by the Bulgarian army and resettled in Bulgaria. Even after the war had ended, the population movements still went on. By the Treaty of Neuilly (1919), provision was made for the free exchange of populations between Greece and Bulgaria, whereupon upwards of sixty thousand Bulgarians left Greek Macedonia to go and live on Bulgarian soil, while the corresponding movement brought some forty thousand Greeks southwards into Greece. But the major change in the ethnic map of Macedonia was yet to come, after the disastrous defeat of Greece in Asia Minor, when by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) provision was made for the compulsory migration of Greek Orthodox Christians out of Turkey and of Muslims out of Greece. This meant that some 300,000 Muslims left the region for ever, their place being taken by some 600,000 Greeks from Asia Minor. These changes dramatically altered the composition of the population in Greek Macedonia: the Greek element rose from 42.6% in 1912 to 88.8% in 1926. Greeks were now heavily in the majority, and this was in practice to neutralize the claims of neighbouring countries on Macedonia while at the same time making Greek sovereignty over Macedonian territory definitive.

Remembrance of the Macedonian Front

Mention of the Macedonian Front was very muted until quite recently. In Greece itself, historians were reluctant to touch on a period so marked by tragic political divisiveness. For Europeans, the Macedonian Front was a sideshow by comparison with the other theatres of war in 1914-1918. Typical is the attitude of a British music-hall song of the time: "If you don't want to fight, go to Salonica", an ironic comment on the immobility of the Allied armies in the Salonica region. The same thought is implicit in the title of Alan Palmer's comprehensive scholarly study *The Gardeners of Salonica* (1965). In actual fact the

importance of the Macedonian Front was not to become clear until 1918, when the Allies' drive proved decisive in ending the war. This has been acknowledged by world historians only recently, but those who were only too well aware of it were the veterans of the campaign, who tried all they knew to make people aware of what had happened, what they had been through personally, and how they had done their bit for the final victory of the Entente. Their reminiscences, particularly those of French and British veterans, are still a very rich source of information for anyone studying the history of Macedonia at the start of the twentieth century, and they also shed much light on the way foreign observers dealt with the region and its population in general. In Thessaloniki and elsewhere in Macedonia, the history of the Macedonian Front is still kept alive by the occasional Allied cemetery or war memorial and by the remaining traces of foreign troops' intervention in the region.



Historic group of Allied comrades in arms (British, French, Russian, Italian, Indian, Anamite, and Cretan), Christmas 1916.



British soldiers on motorcycles wear gas masks to protect themselves from toxic fumes following a bombardment of the area around lake Doiran, 1916.



British and French soldiers at a coffee shop in Thessaloniki.

“...Having evolved from a simple bridgehead into a springboard for aggressive initiatives, it was the peripheral, the insignificant, the largely disregarded Salonica Front that eventually struck the fatal blow at just the right moment, thus opening the breach that caused the central Powers’ coalition to collapse”

Professor Ioannis Mourellos

The Salonica theatre of operations and its part in the outcome of the First World War

Ioannis Mourellos

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Salonica and World War I are a pairing that inevitably brings specific images to mind: the existence, for instance, of a curious medley of races and cultures, to which the circumstantial presence of foreign troops (many of them coming from the distant colonies) added a rather exotic note; the great fire of 1917 and the planning and rebuilding of the city; the upsurge of political passions and confrontations that led to the eruption of the Venizelist National Defence movement and the formation of a provisional government; images, finally, like the existence in the same space of an international expeditionary force that enjoyed the luxury, in time of war, of gardening -to repeat the expression of France’s government- and whose overriding concern was not to add to the already long list of losses due to malaria. But is this how it really was?

Undoubtedly, the name of Salonica cannot be compared with those of Verdun, the Somme, Dannenberg, Caporetto and Gallipoli, which have become landmarks in the history of human self-destruction. Yet, Salonica can, and should claim a share both in the collective endeavour of 1914-1918 and, especially, in its eventual outcome. Let me explain.

First of all, at a purely operational level, we have here all the components that made the First World War an all-out conflict that was quite unprecedented (in the most negative sense of the term): involving static war, poison gas, air bombardments, and wide-range torpedo attacks.

At the level of wider planning, the Salonica theatre of operations was a classic example of peripheral strategy in the context of a widespread war. In other words, it provides an answer to the question of what is the precise role and the value of secondary fronts which, after a long period of comparative inaction, are activated at just the right moment with a view to dynamically overturning the current situation and even forcing the final outcome.

It therefore behoves us historians to set the record straight. I am talking about Salonica’s substantial role as a springboard for the Allies’ final counter-attack in September 1918, the victorious counter-attack, which, with successive capitulations of Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary, and, finally, Germany, confirmed the domino theory before it was even formulated.

So the Salonica theatre may have been one of the least conspicuous in terms of concentrated military power, strategic priorities and even loss of life, but it fully repaid its three-year existence in the most effective possible way.

Now if one were to isolate a single feature that constantly characterised the existence and maintenance of this particular operational theatre, I think one would have to focus on justification. Why was the theatre established? What was to be gained from maintaining it? What prospects did it offer for the future? After all, for three entire years, choices, negotiations and decisions revolved around these three considerations, often, indeed, in an atmosphere of heated inter-Allied confrontation and disagreement.

The first question, why the front was formed, is the easiest to answer. It was to help Serbia, which was being sorely tried in 1915 and was in the throes of a disorderly retreat.

Things started to grow more obscure once there was no longer any justification for the presence of Allied military forces in the area. The collapse of Serbia towards the end of



General Maurice Sarrail bestowing medals on French officers.

1915 gave cause for endless wrangling among Allies, which all stemmed, ultimately, from different perceptions and priorities. The fact is that, with the way the war was now developing -from a war of movements and manoeuvres to a war of positions- the various army staffs were inevitably starting to develop peripheral strategies. But in the specific case of Salonica views and preferences diverged and conflicted.

As far as the French, for instance, were concerned, on whose national territory perhaps the most decisive operations were being carried out, and who, for precisely this rea-

son, were desperately seeking alternative solutions that could defuse the situation by creating a diversion, Salonica offered promising prospects. Paris believed that a bridgehead maintained in the Balkans could distract enemy forces and keep them there. Furthermore, such a bridgehead could theoretically be turned into a base for aggressive initiatives, circumstances permitting, in association with other fronts nearby (such as the Eastern, the Italian, or the Middle Eastern front). We have here the very essence of peripheral strategy.

Diametrically opposed, though equally dictated by strategic priorities, was the prevailing view across the Channel. The key concern of the British security system was not so much to decongest the main front as to protect maritime communications between the colonies and the metropolis. This was the only way to maintain a constant supply of manpower and raw materials, prerequisites for war attrition. Consequently, interest in the wider area of the Eastern Mediterranean focused solely on keeping the Suez Canal open.

An embroilment in the Balkans, by contrast, with all the military factors against it (a numerically stronger enemy, a lack of reliable allies in the region, political conditions that



Carrier ships in Salonica's port.

threatened the security of an Allied bridgehead in Salonica), was fought with danger as far as British interests were concerned. After all, the painful experience of Gallipoli was still fresh and influencing choices and perceptions.

So these discrepancies were the basis for an interminable and fruitless dialogue among the Allies over the future of the Salonica theatre of operations. The crucial questions

of what was to be gained by maintaining the front will never be clearly answered. In fact, if we trace the entire course and development of the negotiations (as the accessible contemporary archival material enables us to do), we shall be surprised by the vague and nebulous wording of the joint decisions, and especially the fact that they are open to different interpretations by either side. They are apotheosis, in other words, of the art of diplomacy and obfuscation. There are many telling examples, but unfortunately this is not the time to go into them here.

At all events, the one major opportunity to make full use of the Salonica theatre came in the first half of 1916; but, like all the others, it was allowed to slip away. The unexpected German attack at Verdun and the major Allied counter-attack planned on the Somme again raised the question of activating and co-ordinating the secondary fronts, with the aim of preventing enemy reinforcements from being transferred from the periphery to main front. The linchpin in this case was Romania, and in order to win Romania over the French mainly embroiled themselves in the process of arduous, time-consuming negotiations. From this point of view, the Allied expeditionary force in Salonica could have played a leading role, forcing Bulgaria to fight on two fronts.

Once again, however, plans and hopes were thwarted by the unequivocal opposition of the British. On the pretext that breaking up the forces could be disastrous for Allied interests, the London government for the first time brought up the matter of supplying the Salonica front and even of withdrawing the British forces from there. Romania's ill-time entry into the war in the summer of 1916 and its collapse just three months later once again plunged the expeditionary force in Salonica into a period of long and irksome inaction.

The whole affair was extricated from deadlock thanks to France's shrewd exploitation of the side-effects of Greece's political crisis. Inevitably, then we move on to the major issue of weighing up Greek-Allied relations, a question that is key, as things turned out, to understand how Allied strategy was planned and carried out in the wider region of south-eastern Europe.

The form that Greek-Allied relations were shaped and the way they were developed defy all reason. Let us recall the general situation in 1915, in the first months after Salonica theatre was established, when neutral Greece was governed by an administration that was barely able to conceal its sympathy for the coalition of the central powers. Yet this neutral country, under this specific political authority, played host on its own territory, against its will, to the armed forces of the opposing coalition, the Triple Entente: total inconsistency, not to say schizophrenia. And that was only the start. Much more critical, complicated situations were to follow, owing, mostly to the Allied military presence on Greek soil.

Greece ceased to control its own actions and, by extension, ceased to practise a self-sufficient foreign policy, while the general conduct of the Allies resembled gunboat diplomacy: ultimatums backed by the threat of canons of a navy that repeatedly sailed into the bay of Faliro, Piraeus; shows of force and military occupation of parts of the national territory; control over the most sensitive sectors of the public administration and the armed forces; imposition of a commercial blockade; support for divisive structures and groupings, and so forth. Although it was dictated by reasons connected with the security of the Salonica expeditionary force or even with waging the war more generally, such conduct could

never be perceived as an attempt at dialogue, especially with a state, namely Greece, that was supposed to be one of the neutral nations.

It would be wrong, however, to regard the forcible and provocative Allied intervention in the country's domestic affairs as an imperialist attempt to infiltrate Greece with a view to annexing territory or creating protectorates. The aim was solely to meet the strategic requirements of a given moment. In other words, the peculiar nature of Greece's relations with the Allies was dictated by the turn the war took; while those relations were a model of unequal, circumstantial diplomacy. Unequal owing to the difference in strength between the two sides; circumstantial because under different conditions the Allies would not had the slightest reason to intervene (I refer to the deposition of King Constantine in June 1917) and force the resolution of a purely domestic problem, which is what, in the final analysis, the national schism was.

At all events, Greece's decision to join the Allied camp in 1917 proved doubly beneficial to the latter. On the one hand, it removed the constant threat to the security of the ex-



The *Balkan News* and British soldiers reading the newspaper in the trenches.

peditionary force; on the other, the active participation of the Greek army (despite the usually high level of desertion) assured the Allies for the first time of superior firepower on the Salonica front.

The attack of 14 September 1918 was eminently successful and won the commander of the theatre his marshal's baton. Franchet d' Esperey was the only front com-

mander who, venturing a bold manoeuvre and carrying it out swiftly enough to prevent the enemy from regrouping, realised a dream that his French, British and German counterparts in the main theatre of operations had been vainly cherishing for years.

A mere two weeks after the attack, Bulgaria capitulated. From then on things developed rapidly and in the space of just a month and a half -after four years of static war- the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary, and, finally, Germany followed suit. Having evolved from a simple bridgehead into a springboard for aggressive initiatives, it was the peripheral, the insignificant, the largely disregarded Salonica front that eventually struck the fatal blow at just the right moment, thus opening the breach that caused the central Powers' coalition to collapse.



French soldiers training their Russian colleagues in French machine guns.


War and Remembrance: Constructing and maintaining Commonwealth WWI Cemeteries in Greece 1920-1940

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The First World War has been a major event in the modern history of the Balkans because (i) it created the largest battlefield that the world had seen in the area; (ii) it broke up the Ottoman Empire; (iii) it strengthened nation states; and (iv) it created millions of refugees. In addition, during that time the genocide of the Armenians took place, arguably one of the least known genocides in history.

Although heavily destructive the war also created a series of significant socio-economic and infrastructure contributions in the region. The forces that took part in it (Entente and the Central Powers) *inter alia* built up new road and rail network; improved the provision of health care; implemented wetland drainage projects and invented new methods of production. It is in this particular context where the first organized military cemeteries were built in the Balkans as part of commemorating the glorious people who perished during the war. The purpose of this paper is to document the systematic British program of caring for the war's dead, as well as of establishing permanent monumental military cemeteries of World War I in Greece.



1913. - SALONIQUE. - Cimetière des Alliés à Zeitinlik, côté Anafioti

Funeral at the British section of Zeitinlik (Lembet Road) cemetery.

The first burials of the soldiers of Entente forces took place in October 1915 in Thessaloniki, in the area of Zeitinlik, a site next to the Lazaristes' monastery, which was used as a headquarters camp and a temporary military hospital. There were provisional military hospitals in the area, while the catholic cemetery of Saint Vincent and Paul lied nearby as well.¹ Very soon though,

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¹ V. Vlasidis, «Τα στρατιωτικά νεκροταφεία του Α' Παγκόσμιου Πολέμου στη Μακεδονία» [Military cemeteries of the First World War in Macedonian region], *Θεσσαλονίκη* [Thessaloniki], 8 (2013), p. 326; M.N. Ρούσσοσ-Μηλιδώνης [M.N. Roussos-Melidonis], *Οι Πατέρες Λαζαριστές στην Ελλάδα, Κωνσταντινούπολη και*

the burials expanded in areas around Thessaloniki and throughout the entire Macedonian Front, which was the area between the Vlore in Albania and Strymonas River in Eastern Macedonia, mostly across the newly formed Greek-Serbian borderline.

The process of managing the war casualties started for the British on December 26, 1915, just two months after disembarking in Thessaloniki.² By the end of the war, United Kingdom had built at least 100 provisional cemeteries and made dozens of individual burials. France reported 241 cemeteries in the early 1920³, and 146 by the end of the same year⁴, while Serbia reported 213 provisional cemeteries in Macedonia and 27 cemeteries in the island of Corfu.⁵ Many cemeteries were constructed for the casualties suffered by the Russian and Italian armies. The issue of constructing and maintaining military cemeteries after the end of the war quickly became of major importance.

On October 23, 1917, the governments of United Kingdom and France requested from Eleftherios Venizelos' government to be granted some land in order to build permanent military cemeteries. The Greek government agreed to this request⁶, following an agreement between Belgium and other forces of the Entente⁷. The agreement was to be drafted and signed by the parties involved, while General Guillaumat attended the matter and submitted the draft to the Greek administration of Macedonia.⁸ The agreement was drafted by a committee that was under the presidency of the former General Governor of Thessaloniki, Periklis Argyropoulos, while General Guillaumat was also involved together with representatives of the British, French, Italian and Serbian missions.⁹

The agreement was eventually signed between Greece (General Governor of Thessaloniki Constantinos Adosidis), France (General Boucher), United Kingdom (General Milne), Italy (Colonel Giamberini) and Serbia (Field Marshal Živojin Mišić) in Thessaloniki during November 7/20, 1918 and it was ratified by the Laws 2473/1 August 1920 and 2630/29 July 1921.¹⁰

Σμύρνη (1783-2004) [Fathers Lazaristes in Greece, Constantinople, and Smyrna (1783-2004)], Thessaloniki: The Catholic Church of Greece, 2004, p. 175.

² See in relation to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission Archives (then CWGC Archive) WG 1084, Graves in Greece - Except Press Cuttings 26 Dec. 1915 - 18 Nov. 1940, Burial return re grave in Salonica, Salonica 26 Dec. 1915.

³ Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (AMAE), Cimetières Français en Macédoine Grecque, Comptes-Rendu de la Mission de Repérage des tombés en Macédoine, Salonique, 23 Feb. 1920.

⁴ AMAE, Cimetières de Regroupement. Macédoine Grecque, Note sur les cimetières de Macédoine, créés ou refaits par les missions de Regroupement des tombes en 1920, Salonique, 25 Nov. 1920.

⁵ Ιστορικό Αρχείο Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών της Ελλάδος [Historical Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IAYE], 1932-1934 A/5/3, Legation Royal de Yugoslavie en Grèce to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note Verbale, No. 24156, Athens, 12 Jun. 1930.

⁶ IAYE, 1921 4.4, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Representative of the Government in Thessaloniki, No. 2960, Athens, 9 Feb. 1918.

⁷ See CWGC Archive, Add 1/1/2, Agreement between the United Kingdom and Belgium, 25 May 1917; IAYE, 1921 4.4, the Governor General of Macedonia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 18326, Thessaloniki, 5 Jul. 1918.

⁸ IAYE, 1921 4.4, Le général Guillaumat, Commandant et Chef les Armées Alliées en Orient, à Monsieur le Gouverneur General de la Macédoine, Thessaloniki, 18 Mar. 1918.

⁹ IAYE, 1921 4.4, the Governor General of Macedonia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 18326, Thessaloniki, 5 Jul. 1918.

¹⁰ IAYE, 1935 A/18/3, Law No. 2473, on the ratification of the Agreement of the 7/20 Nov. 1918 for the British, French, Italian and Serbian cemeteries in Greece, *Government Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece*, A'

As a result of this agreement, several permanent military cemeteries were established in Greece and in other Balkan countries to care for the war dead of the French, Serbian, Italian, Russian, Greek and British armies.¹¹ It is worth noting that German and Bulgarian military cemeteries were built as well, but they only lasted for a few decades.¹²

In the beginning there was lack of coordination and communication for that matter among the various Greek governmental bodies, to the extent that the Ministry of the Military¹³ and the Supreme Military Administration of Macedonia¹⁴ were not even aware of the existence of the cemeteries and the way they functioned. This prevented the effective preservation of foreign cemeteries in the Greek territory. The responsibility for the protection of the cemeteries was given to the local police authorities.¹⁵

United Kingdom was the first country that designed a project plan for the establishment and functioning of the military cemeteries. For this specific reason the British demonstrated ample interest in the implementation of the agreement in Greece. Therefore by the beginning of 1919 they proposed that the Greek side signed an additional agreement that considered the establishment of a special British-Greek committee. A similar agreement had already been signed between the British and the French for the protection of the British graves in France.¹⁶ The committee would be responsible for caring of the casualties and for the construction of memorials for the dead soldiers of the United Kingdom.¹⁷ For

220/24 Sep. 1920; IAYE, 1932 A/45/9, Law No. 2630, on the expropriation of estates for founding permanent allied cemeteries, Kütahya, 23 Jul. 1921, *Government Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece*, A' 131/30 Jul. 1921.

¹¹ For an introduction to the remembrance and cemeteries of the First World War in Macedonia, see E. Gavra - V. Vlasidis, "Military Cemeteries of the First World War in Macedonia Region: Routes of Reading History in Search for the Common Cultural Heritage", in N. Avramidou (ed.), *1st Specialty International Conference on Monumental Cemeteries. Knowledge, Conservation, Restyling and Innovation (Modena, 3-5 May 2006)*, Rome 2007, pp. 179-189; V. Vlasidis, "Those who were left behind. The Commonwealth cemeteries of World War I in Macedonia", in B. C. Gounaris - K. Diogos (eds), *British Presence in Salonica and the Macedonian Hinterland*, Thessaloniki 2012, pp. 46-53; V. Vlasidis, "Rediscovering WWI Serbian monuments in Greece. From Ignorance to Consideration of the Cultural Heritage", in *Archives, Media and Culture of Memory in the First World War: Proceedings of the International Conference, Novi Sad 29-30 October 2014*, Novi Sad 2014, pp. 307-327; V. Vlasidis, *Μεταξύ μνήμης και λήθης. Μνημεία και κοιμητήρια του Μακεδονικού Μετώπου (1915-1918) [Between Memory and Forgetfulness. Monuments and Cemeteries of the Macedonian Front 1915-1918]*, Thessaloniki, 2016. For the memory of the Macedonian Front see V. Vlasidis, "Great War and the Balkans. The use of memory in Bulgaria and in Greece", *Etudes Balkaniques*, 51/1 (2015), pp. 242-255; V. Vlasidis, "This is not Our War: Macedonian Front War Memory", *Proceedings of the International Conference, World War I in Central and Eastern Europe: Politics, Culture and Society*, Faculty of History and the Archives, Dublin: University College Dublin, 2015 (in print).

¹² For the German-Bulgarian cemetery see V. Vlasidis, "Establishing WWI Military Cemeteries in Greece in the Interwar Period: Play of Memory and Complicity of History", in Snezhana Dimitrova, Giovanni Levi - Janja Jerkov (eds), *One Hundred Years of Inheriting: The First World War Phenomenon*, Blagoevgrad: South-West University Press, 2016 (in print).

¹³ IAYE, 1935 A/18/3, Secretary of Military P. Protopapadakis to the Supreme Military Command in Macedonia, No. 154116, Αθήνα 12 Jun. 1922.

¹⁴ IAYE, 1935 A/18/3, the Higher Military Command in Macedonia to the Ministry of the Military, No. 16021, Thessaloniki, 19 Jul. 1922.

¹⁵ IAYE, 1935 A/18/3, the Governor General of Macedonia to the Ministry of the Military, No. 24513, Thessaloniki, 26 Nov. 1922.

¹⁶ IAYE, 1919 3.8, Agreement between the United Kingdom and France respecting British war graves in France, Paris, 26 Nov. 1918.

¹⁷ IAYE, 1919 3.8, Granville to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 24 Mar. 1919; IAYE, 1921 4.4, the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 11178, Athens, 19 Apr. 1919; IAYE, 1921 4.4,

this purposes, Captain A.F. Menzies arrived in Greece at the end of 1920 with orders to inspect the cemeteries in Thessaloniki, Kavala, Alexandroupolis and elsewhere.¹⁸ The agreement was finally signed on August 27/September 9, 1921 and was ratified by a Royal Decree, which was published in the official *Government Gazette*.¹⁹

One could conjecture that the idea of the British to establish a permanent body overseeing the smooth operation of cemeteries and monuments was due to factors such as: (i) their dominant position in the eastern Mediterranean; (ii) their knowledge and interest in the Balkans and particularly in Macedonia during the 19th and early 20th century; and (iii) the support that the British received by Eleftherios Venizelos' devotees and supporters.²⁰

However this scenario is not correct. In fact, United Kingdom's main interest was to manage in the best possible way its losses during the war, as well as to commemorate the victims in the coming years. The Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC) was founded in 1917 following Sir Fabian Ware's suggestion.²¹ The main reason for building cemeteries was the management of pain and grief of the families over their dead. Therefore, they built several cemeteries close to the battle field as well as monuments for those casualties whose

the Royal Embassy of Greece in London to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 2065, London, 5 May 1920.

¹⁸ IAYE, 1935 A/18/3, Note Verbale of the British Legation in Athens, No. 278, 10 Dec. 1920.

¹⁹ CWGC Archive, WG, 407/1 Pt. 1 Anglo-Greek Agreement, 10 Jan. 1918 - 15 Apr. 1937. Agreement between the United Kingdom and Greece respecting British War Graves in Greece, HMSO, London 1921, with letter, 29 Mar. 1922; IAYE, 1933-1941 22, Αγγλικά νεκροταφεία στην Ελλάδα. Ελληνοαγγλική Μεικτή Επιτροπή περί βρετανικών πολεμικών τάφων (βάσει ελληνοαγγλικής συμφωνίας 1921) [English cemeteries in Greece. Anglo-Greek Mixed Committee respecting British War Graves (based on the Anglo-Greek Agreement of 1921)], *Government Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece*, A' 14/31 Jan. 1922, pp. 55-58.

²⁰ M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 93-114; S.G. Markovich, *British Perceptions of Serbia and the Balkans 1903-1906*, Paris: Dialogue Association, 2000, pp. 44-53; S. Markovic, "British Perceptions of the Salonica Front", in *The Salonica Theatre of Operations and the Outcome of the Great War. Proceedings of the International Conference organized by the Institute for Balkans Studies and the National Research Foundation Eleftherios K. Venizelos, Thessaloniki 16-18 April 2002*, Thessaloniki: IMXA, 2005, p. 428; B.C. Gounaris, "British Travellers, Diplomats and Sailors in 19th century Salonica", in B.C. Gounaris - K. Diogos (eds), *British Presence in Salonica and the Macedonian Hinterland*, Thessaloniki 2012, pp. 23-25; B.C. Gounaris, "Constant Gardeners of Salonica", in B.C. Gounaris - K. Diogos (eds), *British Presence in Salonica and the Macedonian Hinterland*, Thessaloniki 2012, pp. 41-45; B.C. Gounaris, "Rediscovering Macedonia", in B.C. Gounaris - K. Diogos (eds), *British Presence in Salonica and the Macedonian Hinterland*, Thessaloniki 2012, p. 13; E. Michail, *The British and the Balkans: Forming Images of Foreign Lands, 1900-1950*, London/New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011, pp. 46-53, 69-75; R. Richardson, *Home away from the home front: the British in the Balkans during the Great War*, PhD thesis, Birkbeck, University of London, London 2014, pp. 165-196.

²¹ For the creation of the Imperial War Graves Commission see CWGC Archive, WQ Pt. 1, Imperial Commission, 5 Jun. 1916 - 31 Mar. 1917; CWGC Archive, WQ Pt. 2, Imperial Commission, 24 Mar. 1917 - 19 Oct. 1917; CWGC Archive, WG 3, Genesis and Composition of the Commission, 31 Oct. 1917 - 17 Oct. 1941. For Fabian Ware and his efforts see D. Crane, *Empires of the Dead. How one man's vision led to the creation of WWI's War Graves*, London: William Collins Publisher, 2013.

corpses were impossible to collect or were not found.²² The cross of sacrifice was used as a sign of sacrifice for the country and not as a reference to the death of Jesus Christ.²³

According to the agreement, a mixed British-Greek committee was created, including four honorary members (two British and two Greeks) and six technical members (three British and three Greeks). The British honorary members were the British Ambassador in Athens and Fabian Ware. The technical members were the director of the British Archaeological School of Athens, the General Consul of United Kingdom in Thessaloniki and the Consul in Athens.²⁴ The honorary members of the Greek party were selected among distinguished people in the army, navy, sciences and arts. The technical members were the Health Director of the Ministry of Interior, the Director of Public Constructions in the Ministry of Communications and a supreme or senior officer of Staff.²⁵ Membership to the Greek honorary committee was granted for a term of three years, although it could be renewed.

Initially, the main task of the Committee was to move the graves from the provisional cemeteries, which were near the frontline, mountainsides and streams, to larger ceme-



Official inauguration of the Doiran military cemetery and memorial, September 25, 1926 (V. Nikoletsios collection).

teries qualified as permanent memorial burial sites. Subsequently, the construction and conservation of permanent cemeteries also became a responsibility of the Committee.

²² J. Winter - E. Sivan, "Setting the Framework", in J. Winter - E. Sivan (eds), *War and Remembrance in the twentieth century*, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 8-39; K.N. Inglis, "War Memorials: Ten Questions for Historians", *Guerres Mondiales et Contemporains*, 167 (1992), p. 9.

²³ A. King, *Memorials of the Great War in Britain. The Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance*, Oxford/New York: Berg Publishers, 1998, pp. 129-130.

²⁴ *Government Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece*, A' 14/31 Jan. 1922.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Moreover, part of the Committee's activities was to request from the Greek authorities to resolve all issues that arose, such as the registration of the cemeteries in the local Land Registry, the judicial settlement of matters regarding infringement, and the placement of the memorials and flowers that relatives sent from United Kingdom.²⁶

Although the members of the Committee did not meet each other on a regular basis, with only four official meetings being recorded²⁷, they worked very hard to resolve the most important issues. Menzies, the Secretary General of the Committee, undertook the responsibility to carry out the Committee's decisions and the daily work. He had very good relations with the local authorities in northern Greece as well.

The British started implementing their project before an agreement was formally signed. More specifically, according to the equivalent French committee, they had already begun moving individual graves and evacuating some provisional cemeteries into larger cemeteries that were located near cities and villages.²⁸ This procedure went on during the following years. Graves were moved not only from the Macedonian mountains,²⁹ but also



The Indian military cemetery at Monastiriou Street, Thessaloniki (photo V. Vlasidis).

²⁶ For the purposes of the Imperial and –after March 16, 1960- Commonwealth War Graves Commission see *The Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Charter of Incorporation dated 21st May 1917 and Supplemental Charter dated 8th June 1964*, pp. 7-9.

²⁷ CWGC Archive, WG 407/2, Greece - Anglo-Greek Mixed Committee, 1st Meeting, 15 Feb. 1924; CWGC Archive, WG 407/3, Anglo-Greek Mixed Committee, 2nd Meeting, 22 Oct. 1932; CWGC Archive, WG 407/3, Anglo-Greek Mixed Committee, 3rd Meeting, 14 May 1938; CWGC Archive, WG 407/5, Anglo-Greek Mixed Committee, 4th Meeting, 28 Nov. 1946.

²⁸ AMAE, Comptes-Rendus, 23 Feb. 1920.

²⁹ IAYE, 1935 A/18/3, British Legation Notice, No. 7, Athens, 14 Jan. 1923.

from the islands, where the deceased from the sunken battleships were buried.³⁰ The main difference was that the British did not work alone anymore, but in collaboration with the local prefectural, health and police authorities.

The British-Greek Agreement and the Mixed Committee must have been the main reason why United Kingdom chose to create permanent cemeteries only in Greek land, while the other Entente forces used space that belonged to other countries. In particular, France created cemeteries in Serbia (now being FYROM) and in Albania, Italy built its cemeteries in Albania and requested creation of one cemetery in Bitola (then Serbia, now FYROM), Greece built cemeteries in Serbia (Piot) and in FYROM (Valandovo), whereas the British preferred to gather all the dead bodies inside the Greek borders, evacuating every other provincial cemetery outside Greece even though they were closer to cities such as Strumitza. The only exception was a cemetery in Skopje with 124 bodies of RASC soldiers (MT), who died due to the influenza virus after the sign of the Armistice with Bulgaria.

The permanent British cemeteries in Greece are as follows:

Cemetery name	Location	No. of graves	Transfer relics from to
Salonica (Lembet Road)	Stavroupolis, Thessaloniki	1,694	After the Armistice, some graves were brought in from other cemeteries in FYROM, Albania and from Scala Cemetery, near Cassiviti, on the island of Thasos
Mikra	Kalamaria, Thessaloniki	1,957	Cemetery was greatly enlarged after the Armistice when graves were brought in from a number of burial grounds in the area
Monastir Road (Indian)	Dendropotamos, Thessaloniki	358	
Kirechkoi-Hortakoi	Exohi, Thessaloniki	663	In 1937, 12 graves were brought from Salonika Protestant Cemetery
Lahana	Lahana, Serres	299	Graves were brought from the two front line cemeteries at Paprat and from other small burial grounds (41)
Struma	Kalokastro, Serres	962	Graves were brought from the churchyards at Homondos, Haznatar and Kalendra villages, and from Ormanli (24), Dolab Wood (17) and Big Tree Well (17)
Sarigol	Kristoni, Kilkis	711	560 graves were brought from Janes Military Cemetery
Doiran	Doirani, Kilkis	1,384	Graves were brought from small burial grounds. The most important was Strumnitza British Military Cemetery, north-west of Doiran

³⁰ IAYE, 1921 4.4, the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 19204, Athens, 4 May 1921.

Cemetery name	Location	No. of graves	Transfer relics from to
Karasouli	Polikastro, Kilkis	1,422	Graves were brought from Hadzi Bari Mah (63), Caussica (62), Senelle Ravine (95), Gugunci village (154), Dolzeli village (23), Reselli (31), from the two cemeteries at Kilindir (45), Ardzan village (22). The whole Kalinova cemetery transferred to Karasouli in December 1920 with 476 graves
Dedeagatch	Alexandroupolis, Evros	64	13 graves from Kavalla Anglo-French Cemetery, 5 from other places
Portianos	Lemnos island	347	
East Mudros	Lemnos island	885	
West Mudros	Lemnos island	226	
Syra	Syros island	111	Graves were brought in from Amorghos (7); Antiparos (5); Ekinosa (9); Heraklia (26); Kassos (1); Ano Kouphonisia (1); French Consular Cemetery on Milo (Melos) (20); Naxos (2); Paros (1); Santorini (1); Skarpanto (Kerpe) (9); Stampalia (Astypalea) (3); Syra British Consular Cemetery (12) and St. Trias Churchyard at Livadi, Zea (Keos) (1)
Corfu	Corfu island	13	
Piraeus Naval & Consular	Piraeus, Attiki	23	
Bralo	Bralos, Fthiotis	95	

All cemeteries in continental Greece have been constructed according to the original plan elaborated by the IWGC architect, Sir Robert Lorimer (who was responsible for Italy and Greece) and adapted to the specific features of the location and soil. They were mainly rectangular plots, with the only exception being the cemetery in Kristoni, which is circular. The graves were either placed in rectangular arrangements or in rows. There are no memorial crosses in these graves, only rectangular plaques that are either placed upright in place of a traditional cross, or parallel to the ground and they are slightly raised. This was a practical solution in order to resolve the problem of paying respect to the soldiers of diverse religious beliefs; although it also gave the families the opportunity to have the plaques engraved at will. The only exception is the Salonica cemetery located on Monastirion Road in Thessaloniki, which is dedicated to the Hindu, Sikh and Muslim soldiers from India, who in their majority served in the transportation and servants units.³¹

³¹ Vlasidis, "Left behind", p. 53.

There is no differentiation between the graves of the officers and those of soldiers, as they are all placed along the same rows and they share the same type of plaques. Usually at the one end of the cemetery lies the cross of sacrifice based on an initial plan of the architect Sir Reginald Bloomfield and at the other end lies the Stone of Remembrance with the inscription: "Their names liveth for evermore". The Remembrance Stone, which was originally designed by the architect Sir Edwin Lutyens, is normally found in cemeteries with more than 1,000 graves.³² The only cemetery without a Stone of Remembrance is the Karasouli cemetery in Polikastro, Kilkis, where the whole area is covered in grass and is surrounded by low stone walls.

The cemeteries and memorials of the islands of Lemnos and Syros were built according to the specifications of the Scottish architect, Sir John Burnet. This is the reason why they combine the Stone of Remembrance and the Cross of Sacrifice in a single construction, which is also the typical plan of the cemeteries in the area of Gallipoli. Furthermore they don't have all gravestones in straight lines and in rectangular plots, but they form together with the gravestones different shapes.

The importation of materials and the construction of the new cemeteries took place concurrently. Flagstones, crosses, wires, stones and bushes were used to build the cemeteries and the memorial sites. The reconstruction project had to be completed by the end of the 1920s.³³ That was not an easy task. Some cemeteries, like the one in Alexandroupolis, were in bad condition and isolated from the British services. For this reason the British Embassy requested from the local garrison headquarters of Alexandroupolis to take care of the cemetery. The garrison headquarters sent a task force that provided occasional conservation, but it also incurred safety issues that the army could not undertake. The cemetery was in need of a permanent guard.³⁴

For those cemeteries in Crete, Lemnos, Syros and other islands, the person in charge of construction was Lieutenant Cyril Hughes, the Deputy Director of Works in Gallipoli; he was appointed Deputy Director of Works in control of the Imperial War Graves Commission's cemetery and memorial construction program on Gallipoli. After those cemeteries were completed, the British-Greek Committee shared responsibility of administration.³⁵

Nevertheless, the most important cemeteries, such as the one in Doirani and those in Thessaloniki had already been completed and consecrated before 1927 in the presence of British and Greek political authorities and people.³⁶ In particular, the memorial site in Doirani and its monument were solemnly inaugurated on September 25, 1926 following the demand of the British, under the presence of Eleftherios Venizelos, Sir Frederick Ke-

³² Vlasidis, *ibid.*

³³ IAYE, 1921 4.4, Note Verbale of the British Legation to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 49, Athens, 28 Mar. 1921; IAYE, 1926 69.7, Bureau du presse de Salonique, Discours du Sir Frederick Kenyon à Doiran, 25 Sept. 1926, attached to the Thessaloniki Press Office to the Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 3806, Thessaloniki, 29 Sept. 1926.

³⁴ IAYE, 1935 A/18/3, the Garrison Headquarters of Alexandroupolis to the IV Army Corps, No. 15271/137, Alexandroupolis, 10 May 1924.

³⁵ IAYE, 1935 A/18/3, Minutes of the 1st Anglo-Greek Mixed Committee of the Imperial War Graves Commission, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 15 Feb. 1924.

³⁶ IAYE, 1932-1934 A/5/3, the Deputy Governor General of Macedonia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 53555, Thessaloniki, 25 Nov. 1927; "Macedonia. The Salonika Army's Achievement", *The Times*, 10 Nov. 1928.

nyon, the then director of British Museum, and General Macdonald, who read out a message from General Milne.³⁷

Unlike France, Serbia and Italy, for whom the establishment, reconstruction and maintaining or elimination of the cemeteries depended on the availability of resources and monetary conditions as well on governmental preferences. United Kingdom had decided that the cemeteries established in Greek territory and in all other European countries would have a permanent existence and would not be affected by political changes, population exchange or the settlement of thousands of refugees in Macedonia, who often settled next to these cemeteries.

Thus they made sure from the beginning that the land provided by the Greek state was legally granted to the British state. The land where the British cemeteries were installed was granted to the British in compliance with Law 2630 established in 23 July/5 August 1921, except for that in Alexandroupolis which was granted in compliance with a Royal Decree in 4/18 August 1922.³⁸ Then the British consolidated a legal status on these lands by registering them in local Land Registries.

The British Embassy requested that the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs register all British cemeteries in local Land Registries.³⁹ This strategy was due to an infringement that occurred in Alexandroupolis' cemetery and in order to avoid conflicts between the British and the local authorities/people in the future.⁴⁰ The Greek state expressed no objection to the request and the Ministry of Public Health and Perception required that the General Governorate of Macedonia and Thrace and the Prefecture of Fthiotis proceeded to the registration in the Land Registries. The Ministry also gave instructions to the police authorities to guard the cemeteries so that any kind of infringement would be avoided. The Embassy, clearly knowing that the Administration would often hold matters up, repeatedly asked for information regarding the course of the land registration.⁴¹ No problem occurred for the cemeteries in Thessaloniki and they were all registered without complications.⁴² The cemeteries in Kilkis (i.e. in Polikastro, Doirani and Kristoni) and Serres (i.e. Kalokastro and Lahana) were registered a year later⁴³, while that in Bralos at a later date.⁴⁴ This delay caused the Embassy's concern.

³⁷ IAYE, 1935 A/18/3, Minutes of the 1st Anglo-Greek Mixed Committee of the Imperial War Graves Commission, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 15 Feb. 1924; IAYE, 1935 A/18/3, the British Legation to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Roufos, Athens, 28 Ιουν. 1926; «Η τελετή των αποκαλυπτηρίων του αγγλικού ηρώου εις την Δοϊράνην» (The unveiling of the English heroon in Doirani), *Το Φως*, 26 Sep. 1926. «Η τελετή της Δοϊράνης» (The ceremony in Doirani), *Μακεδονικά Νέα*, 26 Sep. 1926.

³⁸ IAYE, 1933-1941 22, *Government Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece*, A' 56/14 Apr. 1922.

³⁹ IAYE, 1933-1941 22, the British Legation to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 2, Athens, 3 Jan. 1933.

⁴⁰ IAYE, 1933-1941 22, Secretary of Public Health and Perception I. Makropoulos to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 20383, Athens, 14 Mar. 1933.

⁴¹ IAYE, 1933-1941 22, the British Legation to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 87, Athens, 21 Mar. 1933; IAYE, 1933-1941 22, the British Legation to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 7, Athens, 8 Jan. 1934.

⁴² IAYE, 1933-1941 22, Secretary of Public Health and Perception I. Makropoulos to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 69662, Athens, 27 Jul. 1933.

⁴³ IAYE, 1933-1941 22, Governor General of Macedonia P. Rallis to the Ministry of Public Health, No. 75137, Thessaloniki, 13 Jun. 1934.

⁴⁴ IAYE, 1933-1941 22, the British Legation to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, No. 5, 4 Jan. 1935.

Naturally a number of problems persisted with regards to land ownership before World War I or even before the Balkan Wars. Such was the case of the cemetery in Mikra. Ali Dilaver Bey possessed a land of 11,257 square metres in Floka area. He had departed before the end of the Ottoman administration. During the war, the land had been confiscated and given to the head of the British forces, General Milne, to become a cemetery. After a few years, Ali Dilaver Bey sought compensation, to which he was legally entitled to. Given the circumstances, this burdened the Greek side.⁴⁵

The development plan of Alexandroupolis requested part of the fenced area around the cemetery in the same city⁴⁶, which was not accepted by the British. After an on-site investigation by Colonel G.E. Hughes and the Prefect of Evros, A. Nikas, on October 31, 1933, they successfully requested that the development plan be appropriately altered.⁴⁷

Though the land of the cemeteries might have been relatively easy to regulate, gaining access to the cemeteries was a different and often much harder issue because the small streets that led to the cemeteries were always not registered to the Land Registries. For instance, access to the Indian (Monastir Road) of Thessaloniki, Lahana and Kalokastro cemeteries was problematic since nearby pieces of land had already been sold to individuals, who could restrict access to them.⁴⁸ In the case of Mikra's cemetery, an issue came up on the eve of World War II, when the road that led to the cemetery was closed because of military defensive works. A new road was constructed, but it was not as easily accessible.⁴⁹ The British complained, but this time the Ministry of the Military refused to reopen the former road since it would cut in half the barracks of the Artillery.⁵⁰ The British insisted on the issue requesting at least the improvement of the road, because –according to them– that was the main British cemetery in Greece.⁵¹ The Greek side accepted the request and, a few days before the outbreak of the Greek-Italian War, the road infrastructure was improved.⁵²

While the Committee was trying to find a solution for the various problems with the Greek government, it was also taking care of the cemeteries, listing buried soldiers' names so as it would be easier to find the graves and help them with their needs such as writing

⁴⁵ IAYE, 1935 A/18/3, Ali Dilaver Bey's application to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 19 Nov. 1928.

⁴⁶ IAYE, 1933-1941 22, the British Legation to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 167, Athens, 20 Jun. 1933.

⁴⁷ IAYE, 1933-1941 22, the British Legation to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 8, Athens, 8 Jan. 1934, to which attached is the plan of 1934; IAYE, 1933-1941 22, Secretary of Public Health M. Kyrkos to the Prefect of Evros, No. 38700, Athens, 20 Apr. 1934; IAYE, 1933-1941 22, the British Legation to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 277, Athens, 8 Oct. 1934.

⁴⁸ IAYE, 1933-1941 22, the British Legation to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 76, Athens, 3 Apr. 1937; IAYE, 1933-1941 22, the British Legation to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 149, Athens, 30 Jun. 1939.

⁴⁹ IAYE, 1933-1941 22, the British Legation to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 6, Athens, 5 Jan. 1940.

⁵⁰ IAYE, 1933-1941 22, undersecretary of the Military N. Papademas to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 154403, Athens, 30 Mar. 1940.

⁵¹ IAYE, 1933-1941 22, the British Legation to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 183, Athens, 10 Jul. 1940.

⁵² IAYE, 1933-1941 22, undersecretary of the Military N. Papademas to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 161916 conf., Athens, 5 Oct. 1940.

on a soldiers' tombstone, putting flowers on their graves or even accompanying someone from a long journey who came to honor the dead.⁵³

Conclusions

If we want to evaluate the British policy about the memorial military cemeteries in Greece we can easily come to the conclusion that it is probably the best choice United Kingdom could take about the memory of the soldiers' sacrifice in a war that they weren't supposed to take part in and it was definitely the best solution in creating a new culture for the commemoration of the soldiers in the area of Northern Greece. Until the beginning of the 20th century, dead bodies were not taken care of, while their memory was honored with monuments in central squares of cities and villages.

The creation of the British cemeteries near the battlefields and their maintaining motivated other countries to follow such practice. As a result, the Greeks were also obligated to create their own cemeteries in Axioupolis, Foustani, Doirani, Valandovo, Pirot in order to honor their soldiers.

Nowadays it is not the battlefields or the museums that strengthen the narration of the WWI in our area and preserve the memories of the elderly and instill them into the psyche of the younger generations. It is these fourteen cemeteries of the WWI, mainly in the region of Macedonia, Greece and in islands of the Aegean, which remind us of the sacrifice of the British Army during this war.



The Commonwealth memorial at Doiran (photo V. Vlasidis).

⁵³ See CWGC Archive, ACON 149, Visits - Gallipoli - Saint Barnabas, 8 Feb. 1928 - 3 Oct. 1928; CWGC Archive, Add 4/5/1, Gallipoli and Salonika Cruise, 1936.

The Borders of Ancient Makedonia II: from Philippos II to Andriskos¹

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Because more written and archaeological evidence relating to this period survives than the limited evidence for the period discussed in the first of these articles, the second part of this account will be even more of an epitome than the first. However, one thing is gradually becoming clearer: it is now increasingly possible to define the borders of Makedonia, even if the occasional raids made by neighbouring groups still caused them to fluctuate from time to time. It was during this period that this country took a form that is approximately equivalent to the modern Greek province of Makedonia (if we add a small triangle outside it to the north-west that includes Bitola). Also, it was during this period that the separate ethnicities of the different groups that existed in this area began to fade, and be replaced by a general Makedonian identity. Again, what must have been a diversity of slightly different dialects (most of which are lost to us) was gradually replaced from the late fourth century B.C. onwards by a version of the Attic dialect (later called the *koine* or common language) in Makedonia as elsewhere in the Greek world and in the eastern areas that had been conquered by Alexandros III.²

¹ The publications to which reference is made in the first part of this study remain relevant to this second section. In addition, the work by Ian Worthington, *Philip of Macedon*, New Haven and London 2008, will be found useful.

² The general development of a Makedonian nation, which included other groups who became “Makedonized”, while the original *Makedones* had a higher status, is briefly and accurately described by N.G.L. Hammond, *The Macedonian State*, Oxford 1989, pp. 192-5. In one respect, however, this précis is inaccurate, because it refers to “a standard form of Greek” and claims that Philippos “insisted on the use of the *koine* in the administration of his kingdom”. But in the middle of the fourth century B.C., although Attic Greek was certainly used by the Makedonian aristocracy, it could not be described as a “common form of speech” among Greek communities. The idea that there was a *koine dialektos* as early as this may have had its genesis in the occurrence of these words in a biography of the fourth century orator Isocrates by Dionysos of Halikarnassos (chapter 2). But in the context of that chapter, it is clear that what is meant is that Isokrates favoured a rhetorical style that was free from archaisms, elevated language and unusual expressions, more like the everyday speech that was commonly spoken in Athens, rather than the inflated and artificial style favoured by some orators. He was not referring to the common form of Greek that spread throughout Greece and the eastern Mediterranean in the Hellenistic period, but to the speech of “the common people”. For an excellent recent study of the Makedonian dialect and other Greek dialects (one of which, Attic, later became the basis of the Greek language in Greece and elsewhere), see the article by Giorgios Babiniotes, “Ancient Macedonian: a Case Study”, *Macedonian Studies Journal*, 2014, 1, pp. 1-10. The Makedonian dialect is now not recoverable, because it was rarely if ever used for written communications, and the hundred or so words (as opposed to personal names) that were recorded by the lexicographer Hesychios, who wrote in the 5th or 6th century of the Christian era, using sources that had been created several hundred years earlier, were chosen because they were different from the forms found in Attic or *koine* Greek. So we do not know what the majority of the words used by the Macedonians might have been, and because we do not have complete sentences (except in

In the first part of this study, it was made clear that the borders of ancient Macedonia in the early centuries of its existence cannot always be delineated accurately. No ancient writer, and no other kind of evidence, enables us to describe its boundaries exactly, except when they were marked by the sea or a river or a mountain range, since it is often not clear whether the occupants of the outlying areas under Makedonian control should be considered as being *Makedones*, and their territory as being part of Macedonia, or whether they should be defined as allies or dependants of the *Makedones*. This situation continued to a lesser extent until the time of the Roman conquest, which led to a completely different arrangement. However, the general picture begins to become clearer during the fourth century B.C.

At first, however, there was no sign that this would happen. After the death of Perdikkas III in 359 B.C., after a reign of only five years, Macedonia was in a dangerous situation. The Illyrians on their western border, the Paionians to the north and the *Thrakes* to the east, all assumed that his successor, Philippos II, only twenty-three or twenty-four years old, would be no more successful than his immediate predecessors in ruling and protecting his country, and that they would be able to engage in looting, or to nibbling away at the territory nearest to them, with impunity. The Athenians, far away to the south, were also interested in expanding their influence because of the colonies that they had in northern Greece, although they did not make any immediate moves, while the Thebans were temporarily in a dominating position. Whatever their plans or ambitions were, if they thought of dominating Macedonia, they were all wrong. Philippos turned out to be one of the most successful generals in history, and not only secured the borders of Macedonia for centuries, but made it possible for his son Alexandros to move eastward and conquer an amazingly large area of the world, bringing the Greek language and Greek customs to many other nations.

Philippos had, before he succeeded his brother Perdikkas III, spent some time outside Macedonia. The strongest power in Greece at that time was Thebes, and the *Thebaioi* had a strong interest in controlling or at least stabilising Thessalia, and preventing the *Makedones* from exercising control over that area. Larissa, their most important polis at that time, had fallen briefly under Makedonian control, but this was reversed by the Theban general Pelopidas, and afterwards Philippos and a number of other Makedonian nobles were taken to Thebes as hostages for two or three years. There can be little doubt that he benefited from this. He would have taken note of the equipment of the Theban army, and the way in which Pelopidas and the other great Theban general Epaminondas handled their troops, and this experience would have been beneficial to him when he returned to his native land.

As king, Philippos had to begin by protecting his closest borders from the invasions that were beginning to take place. Here he used an ingenious combination of bribery and warfare. He bought off the Paionians for the moment with such gifts as he could afford, and the promise of future ones; as Diodoros Sikeliotes tells us:³ “After sending an embassy to

the case of a tablet containing the text of a curse leveled against an enemy which was found at Pella), we do not know to what extent its grammar and syntax differed from other Greek dialects. A very useful list of Macedonian personal names and other words is provided by O. Hoffman in *Paulys Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Vol. 27 (= XIV, 1), Stuttgart 1928, columns 681-97.

³ XVI, iii, 4.

the Paionians, and corrupting some with presents and persuading others with generous promises, he arranged to make peace with them for the present".⁴ This did not last long, because soon afterwards, when an Athenian attempt to acquire Methone had been defeated, the Paionian king Agis died, and Philippos, who did not now need to keep such a large part of his forces near the southern border of Makedonia to guard against the Athenians, advanced into Paionia and was victorious there.

The subsequent relationship between the *Makedones* and the *Paiones* seems to be one of semi-alliance at this period. We hear no more of attempts to invade Makedonia from this direction, and the Paionians provided some cavalry later for the army of Alexandros III (which may also have meant that some of their best men who joined this expedition might not only have been hoping to bring back booty to their native land, but would have been serving as hostages in case their countrymen tried to take advantage of the absence of Alexandros in Asia).⁵ However, in the fourth century and later, until the Roman conquest of Makedonia, they issued their own coins. The relationship is sometimes described as that of a "client kingdom", but this may be an exaggeration; Paionia should always be considered as separate from Makedonia until a quarter of a century after the Roman conquest.⁶ Following this, as Diodoros again tells us,⁷ Philippos turned his attention to his western border; and after a hard fought battle against Bardylis, the king of the Dardanians who were located north of Paionia, who had extended his power over the Illyrians, he defeated him and recovered the territory that had been recently annexed.

This victory was followed by moves to protect and extend the eastern borders of Makedonia by warfare and diplomacy. Chalkidike was not yet a part of Makedonian territory, and the Athenians had a strong presence there, because they had established a colony near its northern edge at Amphipolis, and had for some years placed their own settlers at

⁴ In the same passage, Diodoros tells us that Philippos won over the king of the *Thrakes*, who was planning to attack Makedonia in order to install another member of its royal family called Pausanias, by "persuading him with gifts".

⁵ Some interesting coins issued late in the 4th century B.C., studied by Nicholas L. Wright, "The Horseman and the Warrior: Paionia and Macedonia in the Fourth Century BC", *The Numismatic Chronicle*, 2012, pp. 1-26, show a Paionian horseman about to kill a fallen warrior who carries a shield of what is called the "Makedonian" type. But it would not be appropriate to interpret this as evidence for a battle at this time in which the Paionians were victorious, since this type of shield is also found outside Makedonia, in Illyria, for example, and recently at a site near Bonce. A good study of the coinage of Paionia has been published by Eleonora Petrova, "The coinage of the Paeonian Tribal Organisations and Paeonian Kings (VI to III Centuries B.C.), Coins and mints in Macedonia", in *Proceedings of the symposium held in honor of the 80th birthday and 50th anniversary of the scholarly and educational work of Ksente Bogoev, member of the Macedonian Academy of Arts and Sciences*, ed. Cvetan Grozdanov, tr. Elizabeta Bakovska, Katerina Hristovska, Skopje 2001, pp. 13-27.

⁶ The nearest thing to a precise definition of the relationship is the statement of Diodoros (XVI, iv, 2) that when after Agis, king of the Paionians, who had previously been bought off with gifts and promises, died in 359/8 B.C., Philippos moved into their territory, defeated them and "after defeating the barbarians forced the nation to be obedient (*peitharchein*) to the Makedones". These words are too vague for us to understand the precise relationship that developed after this, and there is certainly no sign of any linking of the nations administratively, politically or through royal marriages, other than support in the form of cavalry for the eastern campaign of Alexandros III. The incorporation of Paionia and other areas into a greatly enlarged "Makedonia" will be described in the third and final part of this survey.

⁷ XVI, iv, 2-7.

Potidaia. Philippos, as Diodoros tells us, captured Amphipolis, and took Potidaia “for the Olynthians”, because at that time they were supporting him against the Athenians.⁸

At this time too, Philippos made war on the *Thrakes* at the request of the Thasians, who had established themselves in a city (which they called Krenides) on the mainland opposite their island, because it had access to rich sources of gold. Philippos took over this city, and, as Diodoros tells us, “increased its size with a great number of inhabitants and changed its name to Philippoi, naming it from himself”.⁹ So Makedonia was now effectively expanded eastward as far as the Nestos river.

Also, now that his northern and western borders were more or less secure, Philippos could look to the east and south-east, and the result was that within a few years he had gained control of Chalkidike and its hinterland. An important event was his capture of Amphipolis in 357 B.C., and although that city, like Krenides/Philippoi, was allowed a certain amount of autonomy for a while, access to it gave him a base which was useful for transit towards Thrake. Later, because of its location on the River Strymon, it also became a naval base.

Marrying to gain an advantage for one’s country is common enough, but few kings can have practised this form of border protection as assiduously as Philippos, if we look at the list of his wives that is preserved in the *Deipnosophistai* of Athenaios. Athenaios attributes the passage that he quotes to an author, Satyros, most of whose work does not survive, who wrote at Alexandria in the time of the Ptolemies. It reads as follows:¹⁰

[Philip the Macedonian did not bring women to his wars like Dareios] ... but Philip always married with a view to war (*kata polemon egamei*).¹¹ “In the twenty-two years that he was king”, as Satyros says in his *Life* of him, “he married Audata the Illyrian, and had a daughter Kynane by her. He also married Phila, a sister of Derdas and Machatas. Because he also wished to make the race of the Thessalians his own, he produced children from two Thessalian women, one of them being Nikopolis of Pherai, who bore Thessalonike for him, and the other Philinna of Larisa, from whom

⁸ Diodoros XVI, viii, 1-5. This good relationship with Olynthos lasted for less than a decade, and in 348 B.C. Philippos took the city and destroyed it.

⁹ XVI, viii, 6. This is the first recorded example of the practice which later became so common of naming a city after a ruler or a member of a ruling family. In 348 B.C. Philippos also founded a city which he named Philippopolis (now Plovdiv in modern Bulgaria), and by doing this extended the area of Makedonian control further to the east.

¹⁰ Athenaios, *Deipnosophistai* XIII, 557, b-d, printed as fragment 5 (with an incorrect ascription to Book XII) of the works of Satyros by Karl Müller in his *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, Paris 1849, at p. 161 of volume 3.

¹¹ The translation offered here is deliberately vague. The version offered by Charles Burton Gulick in the Loeb Classical Library edition of this work, “Philip always married a new wife with each war he undertook”, implies that his marriages should be dated in step with his campaigns against his neighbours. This has led to suggestions that the order of his marriages has been misreported in the passage that has been quoted here. No certainty is possible; the only thing that is certain is that with the possible exception of Kleopatra, all his wives were married because these alliances helped to protect his borders, and, of course, because their offspring, particularly if they were male, would not only have provided a pool of successors to Philippos, but would also strengthen relations with his neighbours. It is probably better to conclude that the marriages were undertaken in the hope of creating long-term alliances, rather than being connected with specific campaigns, when the conditions for creating a matrimonial alliance would have been less satisfactory.

he got Arrhidaios. He also gained the kingdom of the Molossians by marrying Olympias, by whom he had Alexandros and Kleopatra. Then, when he took Thrake, Cothelas the king of the Thrakians, who brought his daughter Meda and many gifts. And after marrying her, Philip added her to Olympias. And in addition to all these, he married Kleopatra, the sister of Hippostratos and niece of Attalos, after falling in love with her, and by making her an addition to Olympias he confounded his whole life. For immediately after this, at the actual wedding, Attalos said, "Now indeed legitimate rulers will be born, not bastards". And when Alexandros heard this, he threw the drinking cup that he was holding at Attalos, and he threw his own cup back at him. And after this Olympias fled to the country of the Molossians, and Alexandros to the Illyrians. And Kleopatra bore to Philippos a daughter who was called Europa.¹²

If we look at the individual marriages, the first, with Audata, the daughter of the Dardanian king Bardylis (who is called Illyrian here, because he had gained control of areas occupied by the Illyrians, including Kosovo), was obviously beneficial to the *Makedones*, and if Audata had produced a son, the course of history might have been changed.

Phila, Derdas and Machatas were probably the children of Derdas II, who ruled the independent kingdom of Elimiotis along the Haliakmon river. Although their kingdom had not been as dangerous to the *Makedones* as the kingdom of Bardylis, this marriage also made sense as a symbol of an intended peaceful relationship, and would have been acceptable to the Elimians, after Philippos had shown his prowess as a commander of an armed force. Satyros does not record any births from this second marriage. There is no record of Audata's death, and it can hardly be imagined that Philippos put her away, so it may be assumed that this and later marriages were polygamous (and his father Amyntas certainly had more than one wife at the same time).

The marriage between Philippos and Nikesipolis (who died shortly after giving birth to a daughter Thessalonike) was obviously intended to cement relations with Thessalia, and at about this time Philippos was elected as the leader of the Thessalian League. It should be remembered that although the rulers of Makedonia before and after Philippos II all wanted to exert control over Thessalia, they never tried to incorporate it formally into their kingdom. This is understandable, since contact with this southern area was always difficult because of the existence of Mount Olympos, which created a natural barrier or boundary.

Thessalonike was later given in marriage to Kassandros, the son of Antipater, a trusted lieutenant of Philippos, and he later honoured her by founding the city that still bears her name.¹³

The best known of the wives of Philippos is Olympias, a Molossian princess (the Molossoi had not at this time been absorbed into the Epeirote confederacy). This marriage would in the first place have been only another way of safeguarding the borders of Make-

¹² The story of Attalos's anger repeats a passage in the life of Alexandros by Ploutarchos (IX, 7).

¹³ It is sometimes in ancient texts called Thessalonikeia, the form that would more naturally (like Alexandria) be used for a city named after someone, but its name is now more generally spelt in the same way as the name of Kassandros's wife.

donia, in this case in its south-west corner, but Olympias became the mother of Alexandros III, so of course she played a much greater part in subsequent history.

The fifth wife in Satyros's list, Philinna of Larisa, must have been chosen in order to maintain the good relations between Philippos and the rulers of Thessalia. She gave him another son, named after his father, but also called Arrhidaios (a name of uncertain meaning).

The last marriage that Philippos undertook for diplomatic reasons was designed not only to protect but also to expand his territory. He was given Meda, the daughter of King Cotys, who ruled a group called the Getai in Thrake on the southern side of the Danube, in 339 B.C.

The last marriage in Satyros's list was to Kleopatra, a member of an aristocratic Makedonian family and perhaps the only wife that Philippos took for love, although again there might have been political reasons as well as his desire to make more sons.

Moving on from Philippos's attempts to protect his borders through appropriate marriages, we should now attempt to show how he gained fresh territory through warfare, and in so doing modified the nature of the population of his enlarged territory. He not only enlarged the Makedonian army, but in doing so included men from a number of the different groups that existed in the territory that he controlled. This had two effects. The first was that he created a much greater degree of unity, so that groups that might have considered themselves non-Makedonian came in succeeding generations to accept that they were now Makedonian and that their territory was permanently a part of Makedonia (a development which has, in different forms, occurred in later times).¹⁴ The second effect was that this enlarged army could not be allowed to stand idle, and after he had, with some difficulty, subdued the Greek states that were unwilling to accept his authority, he was beginning to turn his attention towards the Persian Empire when his life was abruptly terminated.¹⁵

The official borders of Makedonia seem to have remained stable during the reign of Philippos's son Alexandros III¹⁶, after a short period when a northern tribe, the Triballoi, attempted an attack, which was swiftly repressed. An earlier attempted revolt from the control that was exercised from Makedonia over their southern neighbours, led by the Athenians and Thebans, had led to their defeat at the battle of Chaironeia in 338 B.C., and the locating of a Makedonian garrison on the acropolis or Kadmeia of Thebes; and when

¹⁴ An interesting and highly relevant note on this process survives in the later *Epitome* of the *Historiae Philippicae*, a work composed by a Gaulish writer called Pompeius Trogus in the early years of the Roman Empire, and epitomized by a certain Justin. The relevant passage (VIII, v, 7) reads as follows: "On returning to his kingdom [probably in 345 B.C. to judge from the context], just as shepherds transfer their flocks into winter pastures at one time and summer pastures at another, he moved peoples and cities hither and thither as he wished, according to whether he thought that their populations needed to be filled up, or left deserted". The comparison with shepherding is less than fully satisfactory, since it may be assumed that these transfers were permanent.

¹⁵ For an overview of this process, see in particular the article by J.R. Ellis (once my student, but in relation to this topic my teacher), "The Dynamics of Fourth-Century Macedonian Imperialism", in *Archaia Makedonia II*, Thessaloniki 1977, pp. 103-114.

¹⁶ Perhaps this is even less surprising when we remember that, in addition to leaving Makedonia and invading Asia, Alexandros had also succeeded his father as *hegemon* of the League of Corinth, which had been formed after the battle of Chaironeia, and his destruction of Thebes would have made other groups very wary of doing anything that might attract attention from him.

there was a further revolt in 326 B.C., the destruction of Thebes, or at least of the Kadmeia, meant that further resistance was not likely to occur, even when Alexandros left for Asia and left Makedonia under the control of Antipatros. This period of relative calm is perhaps also not surprising, since some of the groups that might have attempted to encroach on areas under Makedonian control, such as the Paionians and Thessalians, contributed troops to his army when he moved eastward. Their domestic armies were therefore weakened, and they would also have been in no doubt that if Alexander heard that they were attempting to seize any of his territory, they would never see the relatively small number of their men who were marching or riding with him again.

Alexandros died in 323 B.C., and the heirs that he left were too young and inadequate in other ways to succeed him successfully. As a result, his enormously enlarged kingdom was split, and ruled by separate *Makedones* who each took the title of *basileus*. In Makedonia itself, after a brief war (323-322 B.C.) when Athens and the Aitolians attempted to overthrow Antipatros, who was still acting as regent in Makedonia, their defeat in what is now generally called the Lamian War led to the removal of this threat, and the battle-hardened Makedonian veterans who had served with Alexandros, together with the troops that had never left Makedonia, were able to discourage any other attempts to take Makedonian territory that might have eventuated. In addition, Makedonia now exerted control over much of the southern Greek world.

However, in 280-277 B.C. there was a threat in the form of invasions from what is now Croatia of large numbers of *Keltoi* (usually called Gauls in English). The large number of these invaders, and their unwillingness to fight in the proper Makedonian fashion, led to their overrunning large areas of land in Makedonia and Thrakia, and their penetrating even as far as Delphoi. But fortunately they then retreated, and after being occasionally defeated, were finally settled in Asia in the area that was named Galatia after them. So although the Makedonian state and its economy was severely damaged, its borders stayed the same, although there were frequent raids by the Dardanians which penetrated Paionia and came as far as the northern areas of Makedonia.¹⁷

This situation continued until the second century B.C., when after a series of wars the Romans defeated the last king of Makedonia, Perseus (named after the legendary ancestor of the royal family), at Pydna in 168 B.C. In the following year, the conquerors attempted to weaken the identity of Makedonia and its people by imposing an unusual arrangement on the country. Our sources for this are the Roman writer Livy¹⁸ and, with more detail, Diodoros Sikeliotes.¹⁹ The latter tells us that in addition to stopping production from the gold and silver mines in the area (so that precious metal could not be provided to sup-

¹⁷ In an attempt to defend his country against the Dardanoi, Philip V, whose armed forces had been reduced following the treaty that had been made at the end of the Second Macedonian War, arranged with another Thraco-Illyrian tribe, the Bastarnai, to invade their territory, aiming to assist them to settle there, so that with their help he could gain more territory. But he died as they were beginning to move, and they were soon chased away. This was one of the reasons that led the Romans to suspect that Philip's successor Perseus would also be less than loyal to them, and so they declared war on him in 171 B.C.

¹⁸ XLV, 17-18.

¹⁹ XXI, viii, 6-9.

port a revolt),²⁰ the region was to be divided into four separate republics, or cantons as they might be called. Diodoros described these areas in the following words:

The first contained the area between the Nestos River and the Strymon, the forts to the east of the Nestos except those of Abdera, Maroneia and Ainos, and to the west of the Strymon the whole of Bisaltike, with Herakleia Sintike; the second the area with its boundary on the east being the Strymon River and on the west the river called the Axios and the lands bordering it; the third the area bordered by the Peneios River on the west and Mount Vernon on the right, with the addition of a little of Paionia, and including the major cities of Edessa and Veroia; fourth, and last, the area beyond Mount Vernon, extending as far as Epeiros and some districts of Illyria. Four cities became the capitals of the four cantons, Amphipolis of the first, Thessalonike of the second, Pella of the third and Pelagonia of the fourth.

We are also told that severe restrictions were placed on the occupants of these cantons, for example in relation to trade, and to marriage between persons living in different cantons. Also, soldiers were allowed to be stationed only on the borders of the country, to protect against foreign invasions. Similar restrictions were applied to persons living in Illyria, which was divided in the same way. The primary objective of this experiment (and it was an experiment, because it was so unusual) must have been to destroy the Makedonian identity that had been formed in the preceding centuries, after Philippos II had welded together the original *Makedones* and the other groups over whom he ruled, so that they began to think of everyone living within the boundaries of the kingdom that he had established as Makedonian.²¹

Not surprisingly, this experiment failed. There was enough resistance to it for a pretender to emerge after a couple of decades, a certain Andriskos, whom we first hear of in 150 B.C. He claimed to be another Philippos, a son of Perseus, and gathered enough support in Thrake to invade Makedonia and take control of it briefly, even issuing coins in the name

²⁰ This would have been easy to do, because the booty collected in precious metal by the Roman general Aemilius Paullus was so extensive that it could have enabled the Romans to do without any more silver and gold for a number of years. Mining of precious metals in Makedonia was resumed after nine years, presumably because the Romans needed more silver and gold, and perhaps also because they felt that the informal “pro-vice” that they had created was quiescent. We learn this from an entry in the early Byzantine *Chronicon* of Cassiodorus, dated by the names of the Roman consuls for 158 B.C., which tells us that in that year the mines were *instituta* (which must refer to a re-opening, since they had been functioning for a long time before this), and we associate with this re-opening the issuing of silver coins by two of the cantons (the first, *Makedonia Prote*, whose capital was at Amphipolis, where most of these coins were produced, and had previously issued a small number of silver coins immediately after the division into four *merides*, and *Makedonia Tetarte*, whose capital was at Pelagonia). *Makedonia Deutera* also issued some bronze coins. These mintings must have received approval from Rome. Note: the reading *instituta* which is quoted above is the only one that can be found in the manuscripts of Cassiodorus. Mommsen printed *reperta* (“discovered”) in the text of Cassiodorus’s *Chronicon* which he published in the series *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*. It is tempting to emend this to *reaperta* (“reopened”), even though this form is found only in mediaeval Latin, but on the whole it is probably better to ignore it.

²¹ For an analysis of this alleged “freeing” of the people of Makedonia from the supposed “tyranny” of their kings, see Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, volume 3, pp. 564 ff.

of “Philippos”. But in 148 B.C. he was defeated by the Roman army that had been sent to deal with him.

Since the experiment of breaking Makedonia up into separate cantons had failed, the Romans then tried again, this time with greater success, to destroy Makedonian identity. They created a much larger province, of which Makedonia was only a part, although they retained the name for this much larger area, and thus made “Makedonia” a geographical and administrative name rather than the name of the area occupied by a distinct people. This will be the subject of the third and last part of this survey.



Inscribed base of a statue of Thessaloniki, Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki, permanent exhibition (© Hellenic Ministry of Culture).



Waiting for the announcement of the restoration of the Constitution in front of the *Konak* and the *Saatli* mosque on the morning of July 24, 1908, in Thessaloniki.

From revolution to counter-revolution: Demonstrations in Macedonia in the era of the Young Turks

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“We want brotherhood between all peoples. We are all one without regard to religion or sect. Long live the fatherland! Long live freedom! There are no Greeks, Jews, or Bulgarians, there are only Ottomans”. By these words addressed the crowd in the just renamed Liberty (former Olympos) Square from the balcony of the Olympos Hotel in Thessaloniki the Dönme and Freemason Celal Dervish, just after the Young Turk Revolution, which inaugurated the decade-long Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire.¹ The regime change of July 23, 1908, officially ushered in a period of unprecedented freedom of thought, of expression and of association for all the nationalities of the Ottoman Empire. The climax of various political and diplomatic events in Macedonia has urged societies, parties and especially the Young Turk Committee itself to organize outdoor public assemblies involving the gathering together, either voluntarily or under the pressure of the Committee, of Turks, Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Jews, Dönme (Islamized Jews of Thessaloniki), Serbs, Rumanising Vlachs and others.

The foremost objective of this study is to demonstrate the manner in which the Young Turks tried to manipulate public opinion by organizing outdoor public assemblies, in order to extend their influence in certain population groups and thus get the Great Powers’ diplomats convinced that the empire’s public opinion was in agreement with their choices. The second objective is to demonstrate the nationalities’ attitude in the three *vilayets* (provinces) of Macedonia towards the various political and diplomatic developments as expressed through their participation in outdoor public assemblies organized by the representatives of the population groups themselves. The main sources for the recording of the assemblies are the reports drawn up by the British and Austro-Hungarian consuls in the capitals of the three Macedonian *vilayets*, i.e. Thessaloniki, Monastir (Bitola) and Skopje.

During the revolution and its aftermath the *İttihad ve Terraki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress - CUP) officially adopted an ottomanising policy towards all the population groups of the Ottoman Empire. In the case of Macedonia, during the revolution

¹ Yıldız Sertel, *Annem: Sabiha Sertel kimdi neler yazdı*, Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1993, p. 46, quoted in Marc David Baer, *The Dönme. Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries, and Secular Turks*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, pp. 96-7. In Thessaloniki, streets and squares were officially renamed by a decision of the Municipal Council on August 4, 1908, see Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv (HHStA PA) XXXVIII/409, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 158/5.8.1908 [copies in the Research Centre for Macedonian History and Documentation (KEMIT) of the Museum for the Macedonian Struggle Foundation (Thessaloniki)].

and in its aftermath, the leaders of the CUP espoused a clearer stand for Ottomanism, aiming first and foremost at preventing the Great Powers' interventions in favor of Christians. By putting forward Ottomanism, the Committee has decreased the aggressiveness exhibited by Turks and Muslim Albanians against Christians. In this way European diplomats as well as public opinion of the neighboring Balkan states welcomed the new regime.²

Furthermore, it should be noted out that the leaders of the CUP were not under any illusions that the different nationalities of Macedonia were not perfectly in line with their ideological and political choices. Well before the outbreak of the revolution, it was established, within the framework of their negotiations with the representatives of non-Turkish populations, that there was a general feeling that the Committee was primarily an organization representing only Turks.³ It should be also noted that, during the period under consideration, the choices of the Committee were not always in compliance with the Ottoman government. The latter often expressed its disagreement with the Committee's policy which mobilized urban crowds with demonstrations and boycotts, and pursued the achievement of its own political goals. This is because the government feared that the adoption of these practices could become an excuse for the intervention of the Great Powers.⁴

The mass gatherings incurred since the revolution until April 1909 were organized by various actors, but mainly by the Committee, and were primarily related to: a. July's regime change, b. strikes, c. Bulgaria's declaration of independence and Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, d. the parliamentary elections and the opening of the Parliament, e. the Cretan Question, and f. the counter-revolution.

1. The regime change

The Young Turks' revolution launched a period of numerous gatherings in different cities and towns of Macedonia, which involved representatives of all nationalities who wished to celebrate the prevalence of the new regime. This period lasted until late August. On Wednesday evening July 22, an army Major of Albanian origin, Ahmet Niyazi *Bey*, raided Monastir with 2,000 men. The next day at 11 a.m. the revolutionary officers gathered at the parade ground of the local army corps accompanied by the imams, as well as by Emilianos Lazaridis, acting Greek *Metropolit* (Bishop) of Monastir, in order to proclaim the restoration of the Constitution of December 23, 1876. Thousands of Monastir's residents, Turks, Bulgarians, Greeks, Jews, Rumanising Vlachs and Albanians, took to the streets to celebrate. In fact, on the same afternoon every prisoner, either political or criminal, detained in the prisons of Monastir was released.⁵ The movement has spread on the very same day in almost every city and town of Macedonia, i.e. Thessaloniki, Serres, Drama, Edessa, Gevgelija, Ohrid, Tikves, Skopje etc. In all the above mentioned places, both crowd and officers of the

² M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution. The Young Turks, 1902-1908*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 298-9.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 301.

⁴ Feroz Ahmad, "War and Society under the Young Turks, 1908-18", in Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, Mary C. Wilson (eds), *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*, London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004, p. 128.

⁵ HHStA PA XXXVIII/395, Pósfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 48/23.7.1908, *ibid.*, Pósfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 49/26.7.1908 and Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, *Die Jungtürken und die Mazedonische Frage (1890-1918)*, Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2003, p. 189.

Ottoman army were asking Sultan Abdülhamid II to restore the Constitution.⁶ Bowing to pressure, the Sultan decided, shortly after midnight, to accept the demands put forward by demonstrators and officers.

In Thessaloniki, on July 24, at 9 a.m., 10,000 people gathered in front of the *Konak* (Government House), where the Inspector General of the *vilayets* of Macedonia, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, read a telegram drawn up by the *Grand Vizier* (Prime Minister), Said Pasha, on the restoration of the Constitution. During the same gathering the floor took the Dönme Mayor of Thessaloniki Osman Adil Bey and a Turk, prominent member of the Committee,



In front of the Olympos Hotel, at Liberty Square, the crowd attends the enthusiastic speeches for the restoration of the Constitution (July 24, 1908).

and future deputy for Thessaloniki, Rahmi Bey; following that, the crowd traipsed around the city the lawyer, chairman of the Young Turk Committee of Thessaloniki, and future Minister of Justice, Refik Maniasezade.⁷ On the afternoon, members of various Masonic lodges demonstrated on Liberty Square as many CUP members were Freemasons and the Thessaloniki-based *Macedonia Risorta* lodge contributed to the preparation of the Young Turk Revolution.⁸ The lawyer, CUP member and Grand Master of the *Macedonia Risorta* lodge

⁶ For the demonstrations and celebrations held in Thessaloniki in the days following the revolution see Yanis Megas, *The Young Turk Revolution in Thessaloniki* [in Greek], Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2003, p. 99 et seq. and Hacısalıhoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-202.

⁷ HHStA PA XXXVIII/409, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 146/24.7.1908. In November 1908 *Grand Vizier* Kamil Pasha appointed Refik Maniasezade Minister of Justice, see Feroz Ahmad, "The Young Turk Revolution", *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 3., no. 3, The Middle East (Jul. 1968), p. 24.

⁸ Paul Dumont, "Freemasonry in Turkey: A by-product of Western penetration", *European Review*, vol. 13, no. 3, July 2005, pp. 483 and 488.

Emmanuel Carasso was the first to take the floor, and then Galib of the *Perseverencia* lodge, Ascer Salem and Russo delivered speeches.⁹

The celebrations continued over the following days with the participation of many army officers and soldiers as well as Greek and Bulgarian rebels (*Antartes* and *Comitadji*, respectively) who abandoned their hiding places in Thessaloniki's hinterland. According to an estimation, until August 5th in the three *vilayets* 105 armed bands (54 Bulgarian, 16 Greek, 32 Turkish and Albanian, 3 Serb) surrendered, comprising 600-700 men.¹⁰ In addition, 140 *Antartes* of the Ioannis Karavitis, Georgios Makris, Georgios Volanis and Tsitsos bands surrendered in Monastir two days later.¹¹

Within a month, about 30,000 people rushed in Thessaloniki from various parts of the empire and abroad, from Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, to join in the celebrations. The participation of delegations from neighboring countries indicates the positive endorsement of the new regime by the public opinion in these countries during the period immediately following the revolution.¹² On August 2 the mayor well-received 1,500 Greeks from Volos and Larissa who arrived by sea and then they moved altogether at the *Konak*.¹³ Among others, on August 20 (or 22) about 600 Serbs excursionists arrived from Belgrade, after having spent a day in Skopje. Two days later an assembly was held in Liberty Square, in honor of the 1,200 excursionists who arrived from Smyrna (Izmir), involving a total of 12,000 people.¹⁴ Over the last week of August, 220 Albanians and some Christians from the Debar region, dressed up in traditional costumes and bearing weapons, as well as 100 law students from Constantinople (Istanbul) visited Thessaloniki.¹⁵

Respectively, there was great rejoicing on the occasion of the prevalence of the revolution in Monastir. For three days, from July 23 up to July 25, the city was celebrating. Every mosque and main street was lighted up, bells have been placed in all Orthodox churches and adoring praises were rendered for the restoration of the Constitution. On July 25 a triumphant reception was organized in honor of the men of Niyazi Bey, the revolution's Albanian hero, who was accompanied by the Albanian leaders Çerçis Topuli and Adem Bey. Bulgarians, Greeks and Jews organized victory processions towards the military academy and the barracks in order to thank the officers for their "freedom" and to bind themselves to the

⁹ *Le Progrès de Salonique*, "Supplement - La fete Nationale", 25 July 1908, in Foreign Office, Public Records Office (FO) 195/2298, fol. 169 [copies in the Research Centre for Macedonian History and Documentation (KEMIT)]. The British consul general considered Carasso as the "introducer" of Freemasonry in Thessaloniki (FO 195/2298, Lamb to Lowther, Thessaloniki, 114/24.8.1908). For Carasso see also Feroz Ahmad, "The Special Relationship. The Committee of Union and Progress and the Ottoman Jewish Political Elite, 1908-1918", in Avigdor Levy (ed.), *Jews, Turks, Ottomans: A Shared History, Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Century*, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2002, p. 216.

¹⁰ FO 195/2298, Lamb to Lowther, Thessaloniki, 107/6.8.1908.

¹¹ FO 195/2298, Heathcote to Lowther, Monastir, 49/8.8.1908, Georgios Modis, *Memoirs* [in Greek], Thessaloniki: University of Macedonia, 2004, eds M. Pyrovetsis & I.D. Michailidis, p. 125, and Ioannis Karavitis, *The Macedonian Struggle. Memoirs* [in Greek], Athens: Petsivas Editions, 1994, vol. 2, pp. 816-28.

¹² The Young Turk Revolution was greeted enthusiastically by the Greek press, Sia Anagnostopoulou, "La Macédoine des Jeunes-Turcs et l'hellénisme à travers la presse grecque: 1908-1910", *Cahiers balkaniques*, 40 (2012), pp. 3-5. URL: <http://ceb.revues.org/1128>; DOI: 10.4000/ceb.1128.

¹³ HHStA PA XXXVIII/409, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 155/3.8.1908.

¹⁴ Megas, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-2. With regard to the Serbs' visit see also Hacısalıhoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 192 note 121, where it is stated that they arrived in Thessaloniki on August 22 and the following morning they marched down the city's main streets accompanied by a music band.

¹⁵ HHStA PA XXXVIII/410, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 192/1.9.1908.

Constitution before the commander of the Artillery Corps, Şükrü Pasha. On the contrary, Rumanising Vlachs did not have to undertake similar acts, as their leaders had taken the oath to go along with the Young Turks two months before the outbreak of the revolution. It is for that reason that Şükrü Pasha regarded Rumanising Vlachs as “Turkey’s most loyal Christian subjects”.¹⁶

The Young Turk Committee also used the outdoor public assemblies as a means to demonstrate the positive attitude of the empire’s public opinion towards the Great Powers. To that effect, gatherings were organized in front of the respective consulates. The events that took place on August 14 at Monastir are rather enlightening. An enthusiastic crowd gathered outside the British and French consulates in order to express its solidarity with these two countries.¹⁷ Obviously, these gatherings were held so that the diplomats could inform London and Paris, respectively. Moreover, the timing was not irrelevant with regard to the effort of the CUP to gain a foothold in the powerful European states. Four days later, Ahmet Rıza sent from Paris, on behalf of the Central Committee of CUP, a letter to Edward VII of Britain. In his letter he urged the London’s government to provide support in order to force the Sultan to unreservedly accept the constitutional regime. Ahmet Rıza sent a similar letter on the same date to Wilhelm II of Germany.¹⁸

Although the abovementioned gatherings were usually organized by the Committee, attendance of Macedonia’s population groups was rather spontaneous, and undoubtedly it was not enforced. However, the CUP, even at this early stage, tried to control participants by excluding several population groups, as was the case with many Albanians in Skopje on



Enver Bey, hero of the revolution, addressing the crowd in Liberty Square from a balcony opposite Olympos Hotel (July 24, 1908).

¹⁶ HHStA PA XXXVIII/395, Pósfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 49/26.7.1908. Among the non-Turkish populations only Rumanising Vlachs and Jews could accept the interpretation of Ottomanism adopted by the Young Turks, avoiding thus the possibility to become a minority in a nation-state. Hanioglu, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

¹⁷ HHStA PA XXXVIII/395, Pósfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 53/16.8.1908.

¹⁸ Hanioglu, *op. cit.*, p. 305 and idem, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 167.

July 25, where the prevalence of the revolution was celebrated in front of the *Konak* with the involvement of the crowd and numerous political and military officials.¹⁹ The local branch of the Committee ordered the transportation of 60 Albanian leaders by an extra train scheduled especially for this purpose in order to honor them for their substantial contribution to the success of the revolution; however the CUP branch denied their followers' access in the city. Those who were denied access to celebrations amounted to 4,000 armed Muslim Albanian villagers.²⁰

This particular case is of great interest as the armed Albanians came from the assembled crowd in Ferizovič (current Uroševac in Kosovo), between Pristina and Skopje. They were Ghegs who gathered there since the beginning of July in response to the involvement of Austrians in the reforms undertaken in Macedonia, as they considered that this effort was jeopardizing their national interests. The Young Turks exploited the gathering for their own benefit, in order to exert pressure to the Sultan on the restoration of the Constitution.²¹ According to the Albanian politician and future deputy Ismail Kemal Bey, the gathering in Ferizovič made a more powerful impression on the Sultan than any other protest held by the Turks or the European diplomats, because he considered the Albanians to be his loyal subjects.²² Despite this, the Committee chose to exclude the armed men of Ferizovič from the event held in Skopje on July 25. This was because the Young Turks knew that the Albanians were more interested in achieving their national targets, and far less in any regime change.²³

From the earliest days of the new regime it was abundantly clear that any cooperation between the Young Turks and the Albanians would cause great difficulties, despite the substantial contribution of the latter to the success of the revolution. In the coming months, many of the efforts undertaken by both sides in this direction were doomed to failure. The national awakening of the Albanians had progressed to such an extent that it was running up against the Young Turk's policy that was based on the strengthening of the Sultan's subjects' ottoman identity.²⁴

2. Strikes

Celebrations were followed by another phase that lasted about one and a half months until the second week of October; that period was sufficient enough to shake not only Macedonia but also the whole frame of the empire. It was an era of strikes caused by

¹⁹ FO 195/2298, Satow to Lamb, Skopje, 44/25.7.1908.

²⁰ FO 195/2328, Lamb to Lowther, Thessaloniki, 11/6.2.1909, FO 195/2298, Satow to Lamb, Skopje, 44/25.7.1908, Peter Bartl, *Albanien. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart*, Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1995, pp. 113-4 and idem, *Die albanischen Muslime zur Zeit der nationalen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung (1878-1912)*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1968, p. 160.

²¹ On July 20, the armed Albanians in Ferizovič amounted to 10,000. For further details on the Albanian assembly in Ferizovič see Bartl, *Die albanischen Muslime*, pp. 156-7 and 160, idem, *Albanien*, pp. 111-4 and Hacısalihoglu, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

²² S. Story (ed.), *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey*, London: Constable & Co., 1920, pp. 316 and 364-5.

²³ According to Peter Bartl the Albanians intended to drive out of Skopje the gendarmerie officers and declare Albania's autonomy, having Skopje as their centre. Bartl, *Die albanischen Muslime*, p. 160 and idem, *Albanien*, pp. 113-4.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 113 and Stavro Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 391-404.

various professional associations asking for higher wages in response to the significant increase in the prices of many products immediately following the revolution. Within two months, inflation peaked at around 20%-30%.²⁵ From August to December, there were at least 111 strikes throughout the empire.²⁶ In Thessaloniki, the first strike took place on August 23, when railroad, tram and Régie (the tobacco monopoly industry) workers were mobilized;²⁷ at the same time, more strikes spread in various towns, such as in Kavala, where on September 14 12,000 tobacco workers went on a strike.²⁸ Taking advantage of these mobilizations, almost every employee in Thessaloniki managed to cover the damage suffered due to inflation as there was a 20%-30% increase in their wages, while at the same time their working conditions improved.²⁹



Freemasons marching from Liberty square towards the White Tower on the afternoon of July 24, 1908.

The strikes held by Greek waiters in Thessaloniki and Monastir, on September 10-11 and September 13 respectively, were in themselves memorable. As it has been pointed out, taking into account the strikes throughout the empire in 1908, only the strike held in

²⁵ Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, 1995, p. 98, Yavuz Selim Karakişla, "The Emergence of the Ottoman Industrial Working Class, 1839-1923", in Donald Quataert & Erik Jan Zürcher (eds), *Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic 1839-1950*, London & New York, 1995, p. 31 and H. Şükrü Ilıcak, "Jewish Socialism in Ottoman Salonica", *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2.3 (September 2002), 115-46.

²⁶ Karakişla, *op. cit.*, p. 31 but also pp. 22-5 on strikes of 1908.

²⁷ HHStA PA XXXVIII/410, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 190/1.9.1908. With regard to the strikes carried out on August and September 1908 in Thessaloniki see also Paul Dumont, "Naissance d'un socialisme ottoman", in Gilles Veinstein (ed.), *Salonique 1850-1918. La "ville des Juifs" et le réveil des Balkans*, Paris: Éditions Autrement, 1992, pp. 195-7.

²⁸ HHStA PA XXXVIII/410, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 222/16.9.1908 and *Journal de Salonique*, "Lettre de Cavalla", 15 September 1908, Nr. 1290 [copies in the Library of the Jewish Museum of Thessaloniki].

²⁹ FO 195/2328, Lamb to Lowther, Thessaloniki, 11/6.2.1909.

Thessaloniki by Greek waiters can be defined as being political, i.e. it was not based on financial incentives or working benefits, but on inter-ethnic tensions.³⁰ Moreover, in addition to this strike it needs to be added the strike held in Monastir by Greek waiters as well;³¹ both strikes were based on the same factors of origin and were, in essence, the first organized actions put forward by a Macedonian population group against the Committee's policy. Greek waiters of Thessaloniki went on a strike in response to the visit of 247 Bulgarians in the city who wanted to honor the new regime. The "excursionists" arrived from Sofia (via Skopje and Veles/Köprülü) on Thursday September 10 by a special train.³²

It is worth noting that Greek notables, the Greek Bishop and the Greek chairmen of trade unions and associations did not approve the waiters' strike. According to the Greek Consul General in Thessaloniki, Andreas Papadiamantopoulos, following a request lodged by the Committee, the aforementioned representatives of the Greeks had promised to prevent any disruption during the Bulgarians' visit. However, as stated by the diplomat to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs: "It seems that a hothead encouraged the waiters of the Greek hotels, restaurants and cafes to go on strike, and as result they abstained from their duties at midnight and participated by groups in flag-waving demonstrations around the city on the next morning".³³ According to the Turkish newspaper *Sabah* (Morning), "the strikers were demonstrating around the streets accompanied by a music band".³⁴

The "hothead", whose name the consul deliberately avoided mentioning to Athens, was one of his subordinates. His name was Alexandros Mazarakis-Ainian, an army officer temporarily seconded to the Greek consulate in Thessaloniki who was responsible for organizing the Greek *Antartes* in Central Macedonia from 1905 onwards. Mazarakis-Ainian stated in his memoirs:³⁵

While the Young Turks were about to solemnly welcome the Bulgarians, I have received the visit of the employees of all the Greek cafes, pubs and restaurants, which were the best in Thessaloniki, and many of them situated in the central square i.e. Eleutherias (Liberty) Square, where the reception [of Bulgarians] was to take place, in order to tell me that they did not wish to serve the Bulgarians because of the previous Greek-Bulgarian rivalry that has led to so much bloodshed, and that they were thinking of leaving their posts and go altogether on an excursion in the countryside to have fun. I have endorsed their posi-

³⁰ Karakişla, *op. cit.*, pp. 23 and 31. For a thorough description of the strikes carried out in Thessaloniki by waiters see Marina Angelopoulou, "Issues on the waiters' strike of 1908 in Thessaloniki", in *Greek and Jewish workers in Thessaloniki after the Young Turks' movement* [in Greek], Ioannina, 2004, pp. 61-125 and Megas, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-200 and 321.

³¹ HHStA PA XXXVIII/395, Tahy to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 62/22.9.1908.

³² HHStA PA XXXVIII/410, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 209/12.9.1908 and *Journal de Salonique*, "Nos voisins les Bulgares" and "Les Bulgares à Salonique", 13 September 1908, Nr. 1289.

³³ Angelopoulou, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-8 and 112-5, giving the report of August 31 (old style calendar) / 13 September 1908 drawn up by Papadiamantopoulos to the Greek minister of Foreign Affairs. According to the official organ of the CUP *İttihat ve Terakki* (Union and Progress) dated September 13, on September 11 Greek waiters "were handing out leaflets stating that the CUP has asked them to work on the day of the Sultan's birthday", see *ibid.*, p. 111.

³⁴ *Sabah*, 15 September 1908, quoted *ibid.*, p. 111.

³⁵ Alexandros Mazarakis-Ainian, *Memoirs* [in Greek], Athens: Ikaros, 1948, pp. 85-6.

tions because I was in favor of a reaction against the spirit which prevailed especially among the Greek bourgeoisie and notables after the Young Turk movement, i.e. that there was absolutely no need for national activities. If this spirit was to prevail, the Greek morale that has finally woken up would be seriously damaged.

Mazarakis-Ainian's testimony is of major importance with regard to the position of Thessaloniki's Greeks against the CUP and to the changes brought about by the revolution. On the one hand it is clear that in mid-September Greek notables and representatives of various Greek associations were in favor of the new regime since they did not want to risk coming into conflict with the Committee, and above all they were concerned about safeguarding the interests of Thessaloniki's Greeks. On the other hand, there was a group of Greeks who was not willing to forget the long term confrontation with Bulgarians, even though the Committee was indignant about their attitude. This group of Greeks was also supported by some organizers of the Greek struggle in Macedonia, such as Mazarakis-Ainian, who was right from the beginning suspicious about the July's regime change by claiming that in the longer term it would seriously damage the Greeks' interests in the region. This incident has worsened the relations between the Greek officers who were seconded to the Consulate and the Greek notables of Thessaloniki who were strongly criticizing the officers for encouraging strikers. As Mazarakis-Ainian wrote, "notables regarded us with mistrust in their effort to avert Turks' concerns".³⁶

However, the Young Turk Committee addressed promptly this situation, thus showing its incredible reflexes. In its effort to not displease the Bulgarian visitors, it forced, by putting pressure on local authorities, the owners of these enterprises to open their closed stores.³⁷ The British Consul General in Thessaloniki, Harry Lamb, wrote that the Young Turks managed to convince entrepreneurs to open their stores just an hour before the train's arrival and that, in order to serve dinner to the excursionists, volunteer waiters, mostly Turks, have been mobilized. He also noted that the anti-Bulgarian mobilization put forward by the Greeks had a negative effect on them, as the Young Turks extended a warm welcome to the visitors from Sofia.³⁸ It should be pointed out that the Committee had to react mildly and cautiously to the challenge caused by the Greek waiters, as just four days later, on September 14, Dimitrios Rallis, former Prime Minister of Greece, was expected to arrive in the city,³⁹ and as Pára mentions, the central concern of the Young Turks was to eliminate the tension stirred up between the various Christian elements.⁴⁰

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-6.

³⁷ HHStA PA XXXVIII/410, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 209/12.9.1908. *İttihad ve Terakki* of 13 September wrote that at a dinner in honour of the Bulgarian excursionists in the White Tower's garden on Thursday night, as well as on Friday, Muslims and Jews replaced the Greek waiters who were on strike (Angelopoulou, *op. cit.*, p. 111). See also *Journal de Salonique*, "Les Bulgares à Salonique", 13 September 1908, Nr. 1289, Rena Molho, *The Jews of Thessaloniki, 1856-1919: A Unique Community* [in Greek], Athens: Ekdoseis Themelio, 2001, p. 231 and Joëlle Dalègre, "'Le plus beau rêve réalisé'. Le Journal de Salonique et les Jeunes-Turcs, 1er juillet 1908-30 juin 1909", *Cahiers balkaniques*, 40 (2012), p. 4. URL: <http://ceb.revues.org/1062>; DOI: 10.4000/ceb.1062. On Saturday afternoon the Bulgarians were invited in the Jewish *Club des intimes* (HHStA PA XXXVIII/410, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 216/14.9.1908).

³⁸ FO 195/2298, Lamb to Lowther, Thessaloniki, 123/10.9.1908.

³⁹ Megas, *op. cit.*, p. 201 and Mazarakis-Ainian, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-7.

⁴⁰ HHStA PA XXXVIII/410, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 224/16.9.1908.

On Sunday, September 13, the excursionists from the Principality of Bulgaria headed by Babazanov, a member of the Bulgarian Parliament, traveled from Thessaloniki to Monastir. However, on the day of their arrival the waiters of all Greek restaurants and cafes in Monastir went also on strike, thus causing significant inconvenience to their hospitality. The Committee ordered the opening of certain restaurants to facilitate the excursionists. In this way, there was no further problem caused by the Greeks' mobilization.⁴¹

Respectively, four days later and despite the aforementioned negative attitude taken by the Greeks, the Committee extended a warm welcome to Rallis in Monastir. Upon his arrival at the railway station, the Greek politician was welcomed not only by Greeks, but also by representatives of the CUP and of the local Albanian club. On the following day, Rallis visited the Greek schools of Monastir and the headquarters of the Albanian club. Before the members of the club the Greek politician delivered a speech aiming to bring together Greeks and Albanians. Rallis, as indicated by the Austrian Consul, underlined "the common interests of Greeks and Albanians and made a reference to the common origin of the two peoples". However, the Albanians who were present, as they were not interested in a more substantive approach with the Greeks, greeted his speech with considerable skepticism;⁴² they were relentlessly working on the promotion of their national interests that were often in conflict with the Greek ones.⁴³

3. Bulgarian independence and annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary

Some of the other major events of 1908 that led to a wave of demonstrations, though not solely, were diplomatic developments, i.e. Bulgaria's declaration of independence on October 5 and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary on the following day. On the contrary, the Cretan proclamation of *Enosis* (union) with Greece did not lead to a wide range of reactions, as it was not proved acceptable to Athens.

Demonstrations against Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria organized throughout the empire, on the participation of all population groups, were combined with a new medium used by the Young Turks to primarily mobilize urban crowds: the boycott.⁴⁴ On October 8, an embargo was imposed on Austrian and Bulgarian products. The implementation of the boycott against Austria was launched in Thessaloniki on October 11 and lasted until February 28, 1909.⁴⁵ The Committee ensured that all demonstrations were to take place simultaneously on Saturday afternoon, October 10 (around 2.30 p.m.), in the capital and all princi-

⁴¹ HHStA PA XXXVIII/410, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 216/14.9.1908 and HHStA PA XXXVIII/395, Tahy to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 62/22.9.1908. Georgios Modis described the visit of the Bulgarian excursionists in Monastir in his novel "Freedom" (G. Modis, *Fifty Fatlings (Macedonian Stories)* [in Greek], Athens: Papyros, n.d., pp. 160-4) and in his *Memoirs*, pp. 127-8.

⁴² HHStA PA XXXVIII/395, Tahy to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 62/22.9.1908.

⁴³ Basil Kondis, *Greece and Albania, 1908-1914*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976, pp. 39-43.

⁴⁴ Zürcher, *op. cit.*, p. 109 and Nikolaos V. Vlachos, *History of the countries of the Balkan Peninsula 1908-1914* [in Greek], vol. 1, Athens, 1954, pp. 69 et seq.

⁴⁵ For the anti-Austrian boycott in the Ottoman Empire in general see Roderic H. Davison, "The Ottoman Boycott of Austrian Goods in 1908-9 as a Diplomatic Question", in Heath W. Lowry & Ralph S. Hattox (eds), *Third Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey. Proceedings*, Istanbul, 1990, pp. 1-28 and Megas, *op. cit.*, pp. 365-71 and more specifically in Macedonia see Basil C. Gounaris, *Steam over Macedonia, 1870-1912. Socio-economic Change and the Railway Factor*, Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1993, pp. 226-8 and in Albania see Miranda Vickers, *The Albanians. Modern and Contemporary History*, 1997, pp. 91-2.

pal provincial cities of the empire: Thessaloniki, Monastir, Skopje, Scutari, Ioannina, Adrianople (Edirne), Dardanelles, Bursa, Trabzon, Kastamonu, Erzurum, Smyrna, Konya, Adana, Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem.

In Thessaloniki, the gathering was held in the Field of Mars Park in front of the administration building of the Third Army Corps. The British Consul General estimated that the assembled people amounted to 6,000, but he suggested that the overall number of people passed by the Field of Mars Park amounted to 12,000, as many Turks left the Park at the end of Rahmi Bey's speech in the Turkish language. Upon the completion of Rahmi's



Greek "tourists" from Volos and Larissa in front of Thessaloniki's City Hall, just opposite the *Konak* (August 2, 1908).

speech, the floor took the president of the *Ethnikos Syndesmos* (National League) Dr. Dimitrios Rizos in the Greek language, followed by Svetoslav Dobrev in Bulgarian, Nikovic in Serbian, the Rumanising Vlach G. Tsounga in Romanian, Jakob Kaze in Judeo-Spanish (Ladino), Midhat Bey Frasherli in Albanian, and the Rumanising Vlach N. Batsaria (who was later elected Senator) in French.⁴⁶

The gathering in Monastir involved 5,000 Turks, Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Rumanising Vlachs and Serbs, while in Skopje around 7,000 to 8,000 people were assembled, during a well-organized and without any incidents demonstration in front of the *Konak*, in order to listen to the speeches in the Turkish, Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek languages. Especially in Skopje, the risk of incidents was particularly high because of the large number of

⁴⁶ FO 195/2298, Lamb to Lowther, Thessaloniki, 140/11.10.1908. For the assembly that took place in Thessaloniki on October 10 see also Megas, *op. cit.*, pp. 361-5. For Batsaria see HHStA PA XXXVIII/396, Posfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 17/7.4.1909.

Albanians. It is for this reason that the previous night Major Vasfi Bey, a leading member of the CUP, delivered a speech to his co-religionists, both inside and outside the central mosque, in order to ensure their peaceful turnout at the demonstration.⁴⁷

It is worth emphasizing that, as Lamb noted, although the declaration of Bulgaria's independence caused a feeling of "intense satisfaction" amongst "the great majority of Bulgarians" in Macedonia, Yane Sandanski and his followers of the left wing of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), who cooperated close with the CUP, expressed their dissatisfaction with the action of the Bulgarian government.⁴⁸ Thus, Bulgarians belonging to the opposite faction made an attempt on Sandanski's life in Thessaloniki, on October 7.⁴⁹ He survived another assassination attempt, committed also by Bulgarians in Thessaloniki next year, on August 28.⁵⁰

4. Elections and the opening of the Parliament

As Lamb pointed out, the boycott was at the heart of public opinion until the end of 1908 and, in conjunction with strikes, overshadowed and pushed into the background any development arising on the parliamentary elections.⁵¹ More specifically, only the first phase of electoral processes attracted a considerable amount of attention amongst the different population groups. During this phase, which lasted until mid-October, there were the second degree electors to be elected. In mid-August a dispute between the Jews of Thessaloniki over the candidatures of their co-religionists captured the attention of the British Consul. Then, Nissim Mazliah's followers, who was the vice-president of the Commercial Court of Thessaloniki, "on two successive evenings [...] interrupted meetings of Me. Carasso's supporters. There were demonstrations and counter-demonstrations leading to free-fights and ending in broken windows and broken heads". Finally, following a CUP's intervention, the situation has been gradually normalized after it was agreed that Carasso would be the candidate in Thessaloniki and Mazliah in Smyrna.⁵²

The second phase of elections, which was concluded in mid-November, did not attract the same attention.⁵³ During that phase, 43 Members of the Parliament were elected in the Macedonian *vilayets* (12 in Thessaloniki, 14 in Monastir and 17 in Skopje): 6 Turks, 6 Greeks, 4 Bulgarians, 21 Albanians (13 in the Skopje *vilayet*), 3 Serbs, 1 Jew, 1 Dönme and 1 Rumanising Vlach.⁵⁴ In general, the CUP "acted on the principle of representation for all el-

⁴⁷ FO 195/2298, Edmonds to Lowther, Monastir, 59/10.10.1908, *ibid.*, Satow to Lamb, Skopje, 67/11.10.1908.

⁴⁸ FO 195/2298, Lamb to Lowther, Thessaloniki, 139/8.10.1908.

⁴⁹ According to Lamb, the murderous assault against Sandanski and his partisans (Mitcheff and Tancheff were killed) was committed by Zapranoff, Tsane Nicoloff (former band leader in Perlepe) and Capitan Danoff, *ibid.* and Angelos A. Chotzidis, "Crime and punishment: Political violence in Young Turks' Macedonia", in Hellenic Association of Historical Sciences, *29th Panhellenic Historical Congress, 16-18 May 2008. Minutes* [in Greek], Thessaloniki, 2009, p. 226. On this issue see also Hacısalıhoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 221 note 51 and *idem*, "Yane Sandanski as a political leader in Macedonia in the era of the Young Turks", *Cahiers balkaniques*, 40 (2012), p. 7. URL: <http://ceb.revues.org/1192>; DOI: 10.4000/ceb.1192.

⁵⁰ Chotzidis, "Crime and punishment", p. 226 and Hacısalıhoğlu, "Yane Sandanski", p. 7.

⁵¹ FO 195/2328, Lamb to Lowther, Thessaloniki, 11/6.2.1909.

⁵² FO 195/2298, Lamb to Lowther, Thessaloniki, 114/24.8.1908.

⁵³ In Thessaloniki, the second round of the elections was held on November 9 and the results were announced three days later (Megas, *op. cit.*, p. 216).

⁵⁴ Hacısalıhoğlu, *Die Jungtürken und die Mazedonische Frage*, pp. 254-7.

ements so long as it was not uncongenial to the Committee” and succeeded in controlling the election in Macedonia. It failed only to control the elections in the Serbia (Serfidje) *sanjak* (district) (Monastir *vilayet*), where both elected deputies were Greeks (Georgios Bou-sios and Konstantinos Drizis).⁵⁵ Although irregularities were reported at various different stages of the electoral process, no serious case of demonstrations against these irregularities in Macedonia was reported. On the contrary, a demonstration was held in Smyrna on November 15, when 30,000 Greeks, most of whom armed, marched in front of the seat of the Greek *Metropolit* in protest against the electoral process; seven days later 20,000 Greeks acting in the same way in Constantinople marched towards the Sublime Porte.⁵⁶

The celebration held on December 17, 1908 in Thessaloniki on the occasion of the opening of the Parliament is of exceptional interest. A great deal of effort has been made to



Greeks of Monastir are welcoming 140 Antartes and their leaders (G. Makris, G. Volanis, I. Karavitis and Tsitsos) on the afternoon of August 7, 1908. Acting *Metropolit* Emilianos Lazaridis on horseback.

organize a successful event; the closure of the market, of public services and of schools was mandated, as well as the flying of flags and the illumination of residencies during night time. Moreover, a parade has been organized with the involvement of different army units and numerous representatives of the city’s guilds. The event that was launched on the

⁵⁵ FO 195/2298, Edmonds to Lowther, Monastir, 69/20.12.1908.

⁵⁶ Hacısalıhoğlu, *Die Jungtürken und die Mazedonische Frage*, p. 251, and Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, Leiden, New York & Köln: Brill, 1997, pp. 208 and 213.

same morning and lasted until 3 p.m. was held in the Field of Mars Park; during the event the floor took the Jew and lawyer Joseph Naar, acting Mayor of Thessaloniki,⁵⁷ the chief editor of the *Yeni Asır* (New Era) newspaper and CUP member Adil Bey, and the commander of the Third Army Corps Mahmut Şevket Pasha. However, despite the efforts made by the Young Turks, it was evident that, as Pára observed, the enthusiasm shown by the attendants was not as great as the enthusiasm demonstrated during the July's events.⁵⁸

Similar events were held on the same day, among other major towns, in Serres and Kavala. In the former the opening of the Chamber of Deputies "was enthusiastically celebrated"⁵⁹, but in the latter the distance between Greeks and the Young Turks' regime was evident. The gathering took place in the courtyard of Kavala's military camp in the presence of large crowds; however, the Greeks' involvement was limited and the absence of the Greek *Archimandrite* (acting Bishop) has left a deep impression. The *Archimandrite* alleged that his absence was due to the negative impact exerted by the Constitution's implementation on the Greek element of the empire.⁶⁰

5. The Cretan Question

The Cretan Question was a particular concern of the Committee from early 1909 to mid 1911. Over this period the Young Turks organized numerous demonstrations in many cities of the empire in response to the political and diplomatic developments and the Cretans' request for *Enosis* with Greece. Their main objective was to mobilize the empire's public opinion against the Hellenic Kingdom. There have been numerous protests organized in Macedonia with regard to the Cretan Question.⁶¹

In the period under review and in view of the Cretan Question, a public rally against Greece was reported on January 16, 1909 in Thessaloniki (as well as in Constantinople and other cities), under the tolerance of the Committee. The participation therein was rather weak: around 2,000 people, although it was held on a Saturday, when the Jews were not working and at times in which more than 30,000 Jews were taking a walk along the city's main streets and thus they could easily participate in an outdoor assembly.⁶²

⁵⁷ Osman Adil Bey was forced to resign from his position as Mayor in mid-November 1908, following the intervention of the CUP. Angelos A. Chotzidis, "The Young Turks and the Cretan Question (1908-1911): National and financial parameters in Macedonia", in Hellenic Association of Historical Sciences, *26th Panhellenic Historical Congress, 27-29 May 2005. Minutes* [in Greek], Thessaloniki, 2006, p. 273; and Megas, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-7 and 395.

⁵⁸ HHStA PA XXXVIII/410, Pára, Thessaloniki, 74/17.12.1908 (telegram), *ibid.*, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 303/18.12.1908.

⁵⁹ FO 195/2298, Greig to Lowther, Serres, 15/19.12.1908.

⁶⁰ HHStA PA XXXVIII/410, Pára to Aehrenthal, Thessaloniki, 304/21.12.1908.

⁶¹ For demonstrations organized by Young Turks in Macedonia in response to the developments in the Cretan Question until 1911 see Chotzidis, "The Young Turks and the Cretan Question", pp. 267-83.

⁶² FO 195/2328, Lamb to Lowther, Thessaloniki, 15/11.2.1909. According to the Greek newspaper *Alitheia* (Truth), this assembly involved 2,000 persons, as quoted in Megas, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

6. The counter-revolution

Taking into account the mobilizations against Austria-Hungary at the end of 1908, the Young Turk Committee realized that demonstrations were a powerful instrument in the manipulation of public opinion. This is why in the outbreak of the counter-revolution in Constantinople, on the night of April 12/13, 1909 known as “the 31 March incident” (according to the old style calendar), aiming, inter alia, to restore the *Şeriat* (Islamic law), the Young Turks used it as an instrument in order to rally together all the Macedonian population groups.⁶³



A Hodja addresses the crowd in a demonstration against the counter-revolution movement (Field of Mars, April 15, 1909).

In Thessaloniki, the followers of the counter-revolution movement were too few in number (less than 1,000) and their main request, further to the restoration of *Şeriat*, was the killing of Dönme, who were deemed to be “Pseudo-Muslims”, and of Muslim Freemasons. They have pinpointed as a target these two groups because, according to their beliefs, they conflicted with the principles of Islam.⁶⁴ On the afternoon of Thursday April 15, the Committee organized a meeting against the counter-revolution, attended by nearly 1,000 representatives of almost all ethnic groups, except of the Greeks. Speakers included an editor of *Yeni Asır*, a Hodja, and several others, who gave their speeches in Albanian, Bulgarian, Serbian and Romanian. The participants decided to join the *Hareket Ordusu* (Action Army) and to march on Constantinople in order to “regain, with the last drop of their blood, their stolen freedom”.⁶⁵

In Monastir, despite the call addressed by the Greek and Russian Consuls to the Christians for abstention, many Christians (and Jews) not only participated in the assemblies (one of them was held on April 16 at Liberty Square) organized by the Young Turks,⁶⁶ but they were also among the 1,200 volunteers of the “Action Army”.⁶⁷ It should be noted that both Bulgarian and Greek notables of Monastir were cautious and refused to endorse the telegram sent to Constantinople by the organizers of the April 16th assembly, in which the latter stated their refusal to recognize the new government.⁶⁸

⁶³ For the counter-revolution movement and its suppression see Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks. The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914*, Oxford, 1969, pp. 40-6.

⁶⁴ HHStA PA XXXVIII/411, telegram Pára, Thessaloniki, 49/15.4.1909.

⁶⁵ HHStA PA XXXVIII/411, telegram Pára, Thessaloniki, 49/15.4.1909, *ibid.* telegram Pára, Thessaloniki, 50/16.4.1909. For the public rally that took place on April 15th see also Megas, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

⁶⁶ HHStA PA XXXVIII/396, Posfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 20/16.4.1909; and FO 195/2328, Geary to Lowther, Monastir, 16/16.4.1909.

⁶⁷ The volunteers of the “Action Army” (among them Sandanski and the Jewish socialist Avraam Benaroya) made a glorious entrance in Constantinople on the morning of April 24, see Zürcher, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

⁶⁸ FO 195/2328, Geary to Lowther, Monastir, 16/16.4.1909.

Albanians -as well as Greeks- had minimum participation in the repression of the briefly successful counter-revolution, although the preeminent Albanian hero of the Young Turk Revolution, Niyazi Bey, was the leader of the volunteers of the "Action Army". In view of the above and due to the lack of trust, Young Turks had already taken steps towards preventing any participation of armed Albanians from the region of Skopje in the "Action Army".⁶⁹

In the light of the above overview on outdoor public assemblies organized by the Young Turks or by the representatives of various population groups in Macedonia over the first ten months of the new regime, it follows that the CUP enjoyed the support of a great part of Macedonia's population throughout its political track. People in the three Macedonian *vilayets* expressed their full solidarity and greeted with enthusiasm July's regime change. Even the irregularities observed during the elections did not shatter people's confidence in the new regime. Furthermore, the vast majority of Macedonian population participated in the boycott against Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, and even certain Bulgarians took active part in the demonstrations against the declaration of Bulgaria's independence. In addition to the above, and although enthusiasm did not reach the unprecedented July's levels, in mid-December, at the opening of the Parliament, the major part of the people in Macedonia was in favor of Young Turks.

However, Greeks and Albanians showed little trust in the new regime. Greeks appeared to be much less enthusiastic in the assemblies organized on the occasion of the opening of the Parliament, as well as in the protests against the counter-revolution, when they participated in the "Action Army" to a lesser extent compared to the Bulgarians, the Turks or the Jews. Albanians showed a more detached attitude towards the new regime, and respectively it seems that Young Turks have been deeply skeptical, from the earliest days of their activity, as they did not invite the Albanians of the surrounding areas to join their celebrations in Skopje (July 25, 1908). Albanians greeted with suspicion the Young Turks as they feared that the latter were planning to withdraw their tax privileges, but also as a sign of protest against Young Turks' attitude towards other issues, such as the Albanian alphabet question.⁷⁰ The mutual distrust between Albanians and Young Turks was particularly evident during the counter-revolution.

⁶⁹ Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966, p. 402. Just after the counter-revolution certain Albanian notables in Skopje demanded the restoration of the *Şeriat* (Petar Todorov, "Skopje à l' époque des Jeunes-Turcs", *Cahiers balkaniques*, 40 (2012), p. 3. URL: <http://ceb.revues.org/1087>; DOI: 10.4000/ceb.1087).

⁷⁰ Stavro Skendi, "The History of the Albanian Alphabet: A Case of Complex Cultural and Political Development", in *Südost-Forschungen*, 19 (1960), 275-84, Bartl, *Die albanischen Muslime*, pp. 161-5 and idem, *Albanien*, pp. 114-8.

Public Art in FYROM: From Tito to Alexander the Great

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1.0 Introduction

Public art aims at the construction of a historical continuation thus reproducing a “useful past” into the present. Within this concept, “places of public memory” are an ever-changing visual recording of historic memory. Ideologies, political and historical circumstances as well as current expectations are but a few elements that shape the way in which humans depict the past. As a matter of fact, public art remains an essential part of the complex institutional dynamic, linking the political state and the nation.

In the case of the People’s Republic of Macedonia (PROM)¹, both public art as well as the broader artistic activities of this, previously, federated state were severely influenced by the establishment of the totalitarian regime which prevailed after the termination of World War II. After 1945, the domination of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) defined and controlled the content and the style of public and broader art. The mechanism of propaganda and agitation (*agitprop kultura*) determined the framework and context in which art was to move, and this was the context of socialist realism. Essentially, through social thematography and left oriented art, artists were compelled to “explain” to the people the “achievements of socialism”, but also be inspired by those achievements.²

1.1 First period (1945-1950)

Art now aimed at the cultural and artistic configuration of the people; it sought to express the “new socialist society, the thoughts and the desires of the people”; and to present the attempts of the central government in the shaping and moulding of the new socialist milieu. The “new age” required new ideas, innovative rhetoric and fresh illustrations.³

Although the aims and the objectives were clear, the establishment of state public art was developed in particularly difficult circumstances. The country was devastated by war. There was no money for the construction of public monuments. However, even during those harsh years a number of monuments, with specifically oriented purposes, began to appear in PROM. Among the first monuments constructed in Skopje was that of Tsvetan

¹ The People’s Republic of Macedonia as a federated state of the Republic of Yugoslavia maintained this designation until 1963. In that year it adopted its new nomenclature Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM). Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia this state was recognised by the UN as Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

² Ljubodrag Dimic, *Agitprop kultura. Agitpropovska faza kulturne politike u Srbiji 1945-1952 (The Agitating Culture. The Agitating stage of the cultural politics of Serbia, 1945-1952)* [in Serbian], Belgrade 1988; also Branka Doknic, Limic Petrovic, Ivan Hofman (eds), *Kulturna politika Jugoslavije, Zbornik dokumenata (Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia 1945-1952, A Collection of Documents)* [in Serbian], vol. A-B, Belgrade 2009.

³ Dragan Calovic, “Vizija novog drustva u Jugoslovensko pesleratnoj umetnosti”, *Zbornik Matice srpske za likovne umetnosti*, v. 39 (2011), pp. 183-302.

Dimov. The latter was a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Macedonia (CPM). He was arrested and executed in August 1942 by the occupying Bulgarian police force in Skopje. By July 26, 1945, he had already been declared a national hero or rather a popular hero of the PROM. In October 1945 the local authorities decided to erect his monument as a tribute to his national struggle.⁴ Shortly after, an epitaph monument was erected for the twelve antifascists, among them two Bulgarians, who were executed in prison in Skopje. Simultaneously, there was an initiative to build a monument to the liberators of the city of Skopje. However, this move was implemented several years later.⁵

The establishment of monuments on a large scale in Skopje had been the concomitant of the political manoeuvres that had taken place in the wider region. It is known that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria worked on a project to merge their two countries into a Balkan Federative Republic (1946-1947). Under pressure from Stalin, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) recognized the existence of a "Macedonian Nation". Stalin perceived the notion that the unification of Macedonia ought to have as its nucleus the PROM and that a "united Macedonia ought to remain within the sovereignty of Yugoslavia".⁶ The new orientation of Bulgaria resulted in the delivery of the mortal remains of Goce Delchev to Skopje. He graduated secondary education in Thessaloniki's Bulgarian male high school; worked as a Bulgarian teacher in Ottoman Macedonia and was one of the leaders of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). Delchev died on May 4, 1903 in a skirmish with the Ottoman police near the village of Karie, Greece.⁷ During the First World War, when Bulgaria was temporarily in control of the area, Delchev's remains were transferred from Karie to Sofia, where they rested until after the Second World War. On October 10, 1946, Delchev's mortal remains were transported to Skopje. On the following day they were placed in a marble sarcophagus in the yard of the church "Sveti Spas" [Saint Saviour]. On the same day (October 11th) the first statue in honour of Goce Delchev was unveiled and adorned the city of Skopje. The selection of the day was symbolic; it was relating Delchev's political aspirations with the struggle of the "Macedonian" people against fascism, which was celebrated on 11th October.⁸

During the following years PROM refrained from erecting new monuments to fulfil its nationalistic aspirations. In alignment with the directives of the central government in Beograd, its leaders continued placing memorial plaques referring to their heroes and their struggles against the invading fascists of WWII, including the Bulgarians. Hence on 25 February 1947 they unveiled the memorial plaque honouring the Kuzman Josifovski-Pitu. Josifovski was a high-ranking member of the CPM and a member of the main headquarters of the people's liberation army and partisan units of Yugoslav Macedonia. He was arrested and executed in early 1943 by the occupying Bulgarian police force.⁹ In 1948 the authori-

⁴ Newspaper *Nova Makedonija*, 6 October 1945.

⁵ *Nova Makedonija*, 1 December 1945.

⁶ Spyridon Sfetas, "Bulgaria and the Macedonian Question (1950-1967)" in Ioannis Koliopoulos - Iakovos Michaelidis (eds), *To Makedoniko sta kseni arxeia (The Macedonian Issue in the Foreign Archives)* [in Greek], Athens 2008, pp. 17-18.

⁷ *Nova Makedonija*, 7 October 1946.

⁸ *Nova Makedonija*, 12 October 1946.

⁹ *Nova Makedonija*, 25 February 1947; see also Gjorgji Tajkovski, *Pregled na spomenicite i spomen-obelezjata vo SRM [Overview of monuments and memorial plaques in SRM]* [in Slavomacedonian], Skopje 1986, p. 71.

ties in PROM unveiled the bust of Ortse Nikolov, who, in his effort to organize an insurrection in the region, was shot by the Bulgarian police on 4 January 1942.¹⁰

It becomes clear that during the first period, public art was not in the focus of the regime of PROM. Efforts were made in isolation, but in each case they were politically motivated. Their objective was primarily to construct national heroes targeting first Goce Delchev, who emerged as the dominant symbol of the struggle of the “Macedonian” people for liberation from the Ottomans, but also as a symbol of the struggle for the unity of “Macedonia”. The remaining cases involved isolated individual personalities of the communist movement, who had two distinct characteristics: First, they were members of the CPM, and secondly, had been killed by the Bulgarian occupation forces.¹¹

This situation changed radically after Tito's split with Stalin in the summer of 1948. The conflict sharply highlighted the need to develop a new national identity for the Slav residents-members of PROM to differentiate themselves from the Bulgarians. At the same time, Tito's move was to emphasize the self-contained character of PROM as a state and the need to idealize the national liberation struggle in order to legitimize the universal authority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. However, the Tito-Stalin conflict did not emerge with major consequences in the orientation of Yugoslav art, which continue to reproduce the soviet model for a number of years to come.¹²

In the case of PROM, on October 1948, and despite the serious economic problems facing the country, the systematic commemorative plaques for events and persons associated with the activities of the CPM and the liberation movement of the “Macedonian” people began. In October 1948 the Ministry of Culture of PROM invited tenders for the installation of statues in Bitola and Krushovo. The aim was “*the highlighting of historical significance of the national liberation movement of the Macedonian people from the late 19th and early 20th century, as well as to bestow high recognition to participants of this liberation struggle*”. One can observe that from 1948 the struggle of the heroes of Ilinden was placed in the epicentre of the public art produced in PROM. This objective was clearly and profoundly depicted in the proclamation issued to celebrate the monument in Bitola: “*This monument should reflect the glorious fighting traditions of the Macedonian people*” and in particular should outline the contribution of Goce Delchev and Ilinden. Concurrently, this monument “*should portray the democratic, anti-imperialist and mass character of the [Ilinden] movement, which was later linked to the further struggle of the Macedonian people and the victorious liberation struggle led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and comrade Tito*”.¹³ However, the national liberation struggle was presented as a unity which started from Delchev and ended to Tito.

¹⁰ *Nova Makedonija*, 30 March 1948.

¹¹ It is also significant to note that the inaugural committee for the erection and protection of the historical monuments was established in PROM only in November 1947. The objectives of this committee included the arrangement of the environment around the statue of Goce Delchev and the care of the tombs of the people's heroes; especially those who had fallen during the national liberation war against the invading fascists, *Nova Makedonija*, 20 November 1947. Its establishment was also triggered by the decision of the central government of Beograd to celebrate the Day of Yugoslav People's Army (23 December 1947), *Nova Makedonija*, 23 and 24 December 1947.

¹² Miomir Gatalovic, “Izmedju ideologije i stvarnosti. Socijalisticki concept kultutne politike Komunisticke partije Hugoslavije (Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije) 1945-1960”, *Istorija 20. veka*, vol. 1 (2009), pp. 37-56.

¹³ *Nova Makedonija*, 31 October 1948.

The first public historical monuments, because of financial constraints and lack of time, were humble constructions. The monument devoted to October 11th, 1941 (when the Partisans began to organize and mount an armed insurrection against fascism during World War II in Yugoslav Macedonia), placed in the city centre of Stroumitsa in 1949, was a simple concrete construction. It had the shape of a pyramid and bore an inscription dedicated to the fallen fighters of the national liberation war.¹⁴ Similar was also the memorial devoted to the 18 protagonists of Prilep as well as the shrine dedicated to the Woman-Fighter of Koumanovo in 1951.¹⁵ In the western region of PROM, where the robust Albanian minority was evident, the erected monuments had as their prime objective to designate and give prominence to the common struggle of Albanian and Slavomacedonian partisans.¹⁶ In the same period the unveiling of the memorial devoted to the Liberators of Skopje took place. Given the importance of the project, since it was placed in the centre of the



Liberators of the city of Skopje, Ivan Mirkovic, 1955.

capital of the country, the composition had a monumental character. The sculpture depicted a cluster of fighters incorporating a partisan, a woman and a child. The whole composi-

¹⁴ Tajkovski, *Pregled na spomenicite*, p. 45.

¹⁵ *Nova Makedonija*, 12 October 1949.

¹⁶ See celebrating events commemorating the 11th October Day in Debar, *Nova Makedonija*, 12 October 1949.

tion was influenced by the principles of socialist realism reminiscent of the respective soviet manifestations of art.¹⁷

1.2 Second period (early 1950s - early 1970s)

Since the early 1950s Yugoslavia gradually gave up the principles of socialist realism; a position occupied by bland modernism. It was something between the art of abstract and virtual, between tradition and modernity, between localism and internationalism.¹⁸ As far as the theme of artistic creation was concerned, artists were asked to find their inspiration in the “Yugoslav revolution” and “Yugoslav traditions” amongst all other Slavic people comprising Yugoslavia. This orientation has led to the fragmentation and decentralization of the “Yugoslav artistic space”. In essence, local cultural capitals emerged as centres of individual Yugoslav republics.¹⁹

Within the framework of promoting the contribution of each of the Slavic peoples comprising Yugoslavia in the national liberation struggle against the Axis, it was seen also the construction of museums and memorials to demonstrate the input of the “Macedonian” people within the Yugoslav Federation of States. Again all memorials sought to promote the self-contained character of the uprising of the “Macedonian” people against fascism and its elements. The building, where the struggle against fascism began, accommodating the services of the People’s Police Force and later on the cleaning services of the Municipality of Prilep, was transformed into a Museum of National Liberation Struggle and was appropriately opened on May 1, 1952.²⁰ Concurrently, with the placement or erection of public monuments the authorities wanted to increasingly emphasize the connection between the struggles of the 1940s with the uprising at the beginning of the 20th century. In 1953, using as a pretext the fiftieth anniversary of the uprising of Ilinden, the authorities opened a homonymous exhibition in Skopje, and later on turned this building into the Museum of Skopje. In Krushovo they erected the statue of Pito Guli celebrating his fall during the Ilinden uprising; he was a commander of the revolutionary groups in the Kroushevo region. In the same city they also placed the statue of Nikola Karev; he was a member of the Bulgarian Workers’ Social Democratic Party and worked as a Bulgarian teacher in the region of Krushovo. He also took part in the Ilinden uprising against the Ottomans. In PROM he was considered to be the “president” of the “Republic of Krushovo”, supposedly, of the so called contemporary “Macedonian” state.²¹

The elevation of Yugoslavia in the third pole of the international stage, following the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, in conjunction with its economic improvement gave Yugoslavia a new impetus to public art. The country now had enough prestige and adequate financial resources to strengthen her image. In the interior of the state, the process resulted in the transformation of Yugoslavia into a huge construction site. Across

¹⁷ Danjela Velimirovic, “One su bile svuda - stizale su sve: konstrukcija heroina novog doba (1945-1951), *Etno-antropoloski Problemi*, vol. 1 (2012), pp. 167-183.

¹⁸ Miodrag B. Protic (ed.), *Jugoslovensko slikarstvo seste decenije (Yugoslav Painting in the 1960s)* [in Serbian], Belgrade 1980.

¹⁹ Gatalovic, “Izmedju ideologije i stvarnosti”, *ibid.*

²⁰ http://www.bitolamuseum.org/images/stories/zbornik_2012/Belevski_Rubinco.pdf; See also *Nova Makedonija*, 2 May 1952.

²¹ *Nova Makedonija*, 2 August 1953.

the country, monuments celebrating the partisan struggle and honouring those who fell on the battlefield were constructed. The erection of colossal architectural creations emerged from the need to give prominence to the image of the national liberation struggle and its historical meaning in the rise to power of the CPY.

The first in a series of colossal architectural edifice in PROM was the Monument to the Unbeaten [Mogilata na nepobedenite], which was constructed in 1961 celebrating the



Monument to the Unbeaten, Bogdan Bogdanovic, 1961.

memory of those who fell during the national liberation struggle. This monument was planned by Serbian architect Bogdan Bogdanovic; it comprised of two portions, the crypt and its memorial urns. The crypt consists of a common tomb for all those fallen for the liberation of the country, whilst in its marble flagstones their names were inscribed. The other portion depicts eight marble urns which symbolize the eight divisions which were formed during the national liberation war. The main urn, which is the largest, symbolizes the unbeaten “Macedonian” people.²² During the same period monu-

ments of the same thematography, yet of reduced proportions, were placed in other urban centres. For example, the memorial complex Butel [Memorijalni Kompleks “Butel” (1961)] at the Skopje’s cemetery, the memorial commemorating those fallen in Tetovo, as well as the memorial in Beltsista and so on. Despite their memorial character, these monuments had as their central theme again the liberation struggle of WWII (1941-1944). Broadly speaking, the monuments had a local character and referred to those who sacrificed their lives for the liberation of these particular regions.

During the 1960s in Yugoslavia there was a conflict between supporters of centralization and those of decentralization. The fall of the Deputy President and head of the secret services Aleksandar Rankovic (1966) marked the beginning of a new period. The victory of the supporters of decentralization of the Yugoslav state apparently was reinforced. Nationalism had begun to develop among the peoples in the various Republics of Yugoslavia. During this period Yugoslav historians failed in their effort to compile a unique and common history of the peoples comprising this federated state. As a consequence, each federated state began writing its own national history. In 1969 in Skopje the three-volume *History of the Macedonian People* was released. At the same time, reinforcement of the institutions that promote national identity, such as the “Macedonian Orthodox Church”, the “Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts”, etc., began. In essence, the process leading to the decentralization of the authority of Belgrade, which offered increasing power to the States as a

²² Vaska Sandeva, Katerina Despot, Aleksandra Dimoska, Ana Mitanoska, “Analysis of the composition and decorative monumental sculpture in the park.pdf”, <http://eprints.ugd.edu.mk/3973/>

matter of fact, was used as a pretext in reinforcing the power of the nationalist elite of the constituent republics.²³

At the beginning of the 1960s, Greek-Yugoslav relations were in crisis because of the Macedonian Question. The rift was caused as a result of the comments raised by Slavomacedonian officials about a “Macedonian” minority in the Greek region of Macedonia, Greece. The Greek tangible position was that “there was no Slavomacedonian minority” in its territory. Furthermore Athens did not recognize the existence of a “Macedonian” nation. Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations faced the same problems. In 1963 the BCP believed that it was after 1945 that the “Macedonian” national identity began to be constructed within PROM. Moreover, it believed that the “Macedonian” nation could not have historical roots in the 19th century or earlier.²⁴

The Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) responded by building huge monuments to refute the claims. In 1968 the new monument for Ilinden uprising called “Makedonium” was designed. Princeton scholar Keith Brown depicted in his studies the interest-



Makedonium, Jordan and Iskra Grabul, 1974.

²³ Stavroula Mavrogeni, *Ekpaideutiki metarithmisi kai ethnikismos. I periptosi ton xoron tis proin Yugoslavias (Educational Reforms and Nationalism: The case of the former Yugoslav States)* [in Greek], Thessaloniki 2013.

²⁴ Konstantinos Katsanos, *To “aniparkto” zitima. Oi Ellino-giougkoslavikes sxeseis kai to Makedoniko, 1950-1967 (The “Non-issue”: The Greco-Yugoslav Relations and the Macedonian Question 1950-1967)* [in Greek], Thessaloniki 2013; also, Spyridon Sfetis, *To Makedoniko kai i Boulgaria. Pliri ta aporrta eggafa, 1950-1967 (The Macedonian Question and Bulgaria. Unabridged the Strictly Confidential Bulgarian Documents, 1950-1967)* [in Greek], Thessaloniki 2009.

ing redevelopment of the original proposal concerning this monument from an artistic as well as a political perspective. The artistic solution which was given by Jordan and Iskra Grabul, who had originally designed the memorial wanting to transmit a universal message about freedom, suffered a series of interfering changes which finally led to a futuristic result.

The monument had a dual meaning: first, was its futuristic artistic construction; second, was the political message. The political message of the monument was clear. Yugoslav Macedonia sought to ensure exclusively for her history the heritage of Ilinden uprising, which was claimed by Bulgaria and was refused by Greece. The political meaning of the monument was the result of the prevailing perception vis a vis history of the “Macedonian People” in SROM as this was manifested in the homonym history published by the Institute of National History. In the crypt of the monument there was a list of heroes and events connected with the history of the “Macedonians”. The list began with the name of Saint Clement of Ochrid followed by the name of Bulgarian Tsar Samuel (997-1014), the Karposh’s Uprising (1689) and the names of the Miladinov brothers (Dimitar, 1810-1862, and Konstantin, 1830-1862) as well as references to the Greek Civil War (1946-1949). At that time, politicians did not accept this view of history. The presentation of the history of the “Macedonian” people finally was restricted only to the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th from the originally scheduled 11 centuries that they wished to cover. Yet, the political messages that they wished to convey were clear: (a) presentation of Ilinden uprising as an introduction to the national liberation war (1941-1944); (b) recognition of the SROM as an equal member of the Yugoslav federation after the first plenary session of Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM), the proclamation of a “Macedonian” nation-state (1944), and (c) the “Macedonian” area grandiosely extended across the whole of the geographical area of Macedonia incorporating in addition the sovereign regions of Bulgaria and Greece.²⁵ As a matter of fact, “Makedonium” was the first monument to recount the whole national liberation struggle of the “Macedonian” people and declare as “Macedonian” the entire geographic area of Macedonia. However, it selectively presented various historical events and historical figures who participated in them to serve political means.

1.3 Third period (late 1970s - 1991)

The process for the construction of “Makedonium” caused broader discussions on the role of public art. It became apparent that the legal framework had to change to accommodate the legitimacy of the arguments. According to the laws of 1960 and 1965, public monuments were only architectural, sculptural or painterly constructions of proven artistic value placed in public places.²⁶ By contrast, the law of 1972 clearly defined what was now to be considered as public monuments: “...*those that refer to events or personalities of the history and culture of the Macedonian people, ethnicities and ethnic groups in the*

²⁵ Keith Brown, *The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation*, Princeton 2003, pp. 153-180.

²⁶ «Zakon za podiganje na javni spomenici», *Sluzben Vesnik na Socijalisticka Republika Makedonija*, vol. 16/20 May 1960; see also «Zakon za podiganje na javni spomenici», *Sluzben Vesnik na Socijalisticka Republika Makedonija*, vol. 14/17 April 1965.

SROM, history and culture of other nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, the international labour movement and cultural history in general'.²⁷

Thus, it became now evident that broader concepts such as the value of freedom, as envisaged by the Grabul couple, would no longer be acceptable in the public art. Therefore, monuments that were built after this law, such as those in Stip (1974) and Veles (1979), have explicit meanings in terms of the national liberation war. At the same time, since the enforced law did not constrain thematography of public monuments on or about the national liberation struggle, specific monuments that were constructed in various parts of the country began to draw their themes from other historical periods and mainly from the original list of the "Macedonian" heroes who were identified with the construction of the "Makedonium". In Galitsnic they established a museum dedicated to Georgi Puleski, whereas in Ochrid they erected the statue of Grigor Prlicev, in Strounga memorial in memory of the Miladinov brothers and finally in front of the central library of Skopje the statue of Saint Clement of Ochrid.²⁸ Many years later, at the square facing the parliament of the new state, the authorities erected a memorial dedicated to the events of the Greek Civil War and specifically to the evacuation of children from Greek Macedonia (1948-1949).²⁹

1.4 Fourth Period (1991 - today)

It becomes clear that during the period of socialism the national liberation struggle was the focus of public art, whose aim was to legalize the power of the Communist Party under the leadership of Tito. The situation dramatically changed after the proclamation of the independence of "Macedonia" in 1991. In that country we now have a new version of political history, the creation of a new past and the formation of a new national identity. The authorities are now seeking at any cost the re-examination of their history. The history of the "Macedonian" people is now presented as a continuation of the ancient Macedonian Hellenes to the Slav-Macedonians.

The end manufactured result of this process was the public art program entitled "Skopje 2014". The program is the best example of architecture which Jovanovic has called "Turbo Architecture". The Serbian architect pointed to it as "a post-socialist mainstream in nationalizing collective identity through architecture".³⁰ As Julia Lechler notices, "Turbo Architecture" turned Skopje to a city "*between Amnesia and Phantasia*".³¹ Hence the statue of Alexander the Great together with the communist president of PROM Metodija Andonov Cento as well as the Albanian communist and legal personality Nexhat Agolli coexist within the same space. The latter was executed in 1949 by Slavomacedonian fighters who were defending their country against the Albanian fighters of the Albanian National Liberation Army (UCK). The new, loyally dubious process in the country was named "antiquisation" or

²⁷ «Zakon za podiganje na javni spomenici», *Služben Vesnik na Socijalistička Republika Makedonija*, vol. 44/25 December 1972.

²⁸ Tajkovski, *Pregled na spomenicite*, pp. 9-11.

²⁹ Loring M. Danforth - Riki Van Boeschoten, *Children of the Greek Civil War: Refugees and the Politics of Memory*, Chicago 2012, pp. 255-266.

³⁰ Srđan Jovanović Weiss, *Almost Architecture*, Stuttgart 2006.

³¹ Julia Lechler, "Reading Skopje 2009: A City between Amnesia and Phantasia. Architecture, urban space, memory and identity", in Stephanie Herold, Benjamin Langer, Julia Lechler (eds), *Reading the City. Urban Space and Memory in Skopje*, Berlin 2010, pp. 37-49.

“boukephalism”. Monuments concerning the latter period of the country’s history started to spread all over, including monuments of controversial personalities as well as those concerning the history of ancient Hellenic Macedonia (Alexander the Great, Phillip of Macedon etc.). The new trends established a deep schism amongst the Slav-Macedonians, dividing them between those who identified with the Ancient Macedonians and those who insisted on their Slavic identity.³²

By 2001, however, it became obvious that in addition to the intra-ethnic identity conflict amongst the Slav-Macedonians, the ethnic crisis between them and the Albanians reinforced the position of the robust Albanian minority in the country. The inter-ethnic rift impelled the Albanians to claim prominence and prestige for their own history and to place monuments of “their own” heroes, mapping, thus, “their own” areas. Just opposite the statue of Alexander the Great, the newly discovered ancestor of the Slav-Macedonians, the Albanians constructed the statue of Skanderbeg.³³ Representatives of the Albanian minority also developed their own historical revisionism and memory of WWII and the internal crisis of 2001. Their leaders erected numerous monuments commemorating their own history in the FYROM, including the shrine dedicated to the activities of the Albanian nationalist



Alexander the Great, Valentina Stefanovska, 2011.

organization “Balli Kombetar” and the statue of Antem Yiasari, founder of the National Liberation Army in Kossovo.³⁴ At the same time, to celebrate the centenary from the foundation of the Albanian state (1912), the leader of the Albanian Party in the FYROM unveiled, in the village Sloupcane, a monument dedicated to the National Liberation Army.³⁵

From the aforementioned analysis, it becomes apparent that public art was a political tool employed in mapping out areas and in the invention of a new past and the genesis of a new national identity. At the same time public art is being manipulated in the process of mapping certain regions with a new historical past as well as an exhibition of power from the two dominant ethnic groups in FYROM. In 2006 the statue of the Albanian Skanderbeg was the highest in Skopje until the placement of a 25-meter statue of Alexander the Great. Opposite that, a 30 meter statue of Mother Teresa, who was born in Skopje but was of Albanian origin, was planned to be erected.³⁶

³² <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/ghosts-of-the-past-endanger-macedonia-s-future>

³³ “Otkriven spomenikot na Skender-ber vo Skopje”, newspaper *Utrinski Vesnik*, 28 November 2006.

³⁴ Kuzman Georgievski, “Vo Skopsko Blace se podiga spomenik so izmisleni fakti”, *Utrinski Vesnik*, 1 December 2004.

³⁵ <http://a1on.mk/wordpress/archives/63928>

³⁶ “Postavena plocata za monumentalniot spomenik na majka Tereza”, newspaper *Dnevnik*, 25 January 2013.

Similar disputes and rifts between the two dominant communities erupted during the time of the construction of the Officers' Club building. In 1929 in the central square of Skopje and at the site of Bournali Mosque the Serbs had erected there the Officers' Club as a symbol of the Serbian domination in the region. This building was demolished during the 1963 earthquake. According to the elaborative yet controversial program "Skopje 2014" the old building had to be replaced by a new grandiose Officers' Club incorporating also an impressive hotel. However, the sizeable Islamic community in the country strongly reacted against the initiative considering the move a provocation against their faith and symbol and places in danger once again the fragile inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in FYROM.³⁷

2.0 Conclusions

As Julia Lechler clearly ascertained, "to erect a new symbolical capital, as we see in nowadays modern Skopje, is not an easy undertaking and goes along with the erasing of memory and a forced collective amnesia. To cause this collective process of forgetting there are needed special strategies, as Umberto Eco states: that which should be forgotten must be overlaid and reproduced by false synonyms. The actual development is creating amnesia among the people and tries to create the tabula rasa. VMRO needs to accomplish its ideas of the Macedonian [*sic*] national identity, which will not help to strengthen the weak multi-ethnic and multi-religious state of Macedonia and to create the imperatively necessary common state identity in which all citizens can find themselves".³⁸ However, leaders in Skopje do not seem to recognize the need to develop a common state identity. These efforts are isolated. The statue of the Unknown Soldier, which worldwide symbolizes the unity of the nation, was placed in the centre of Skopje only in 2012.

³⁷ Josif Dzokov, "Gradot si ja vrakja najmonumentalnata gradba", *Nova Makedonija*, 5 January 2015.

³⁸ Lechler, "Reading Skopje 2009", *ibid*, p. 46.



The Museum for the Macedonian Struggle

The Museum for the Macedonian Struggle is located in the centre of the city of Thessaloniki, Central Macedonia, Greece. It occupies a neoclassical building built in 1893 and designed by the renowned German philhellene architect Ernst Ziller to house the Greek Consulate General in Thessaloniki.

In its six ground-floor rooms the Museum graphically illustrates modern and contemporary history of Greek Macedonia. It presents the social, economic, political and military developments that shaped the fate of this historical Hellenic region between mid-nineteenth and early twentieth century. Through its exhibit the Museum enables the visitor to form a global picture not only of the revolutionary movements in the area but also of the rapidly changing society of the southern Balkans and its endeavour to balance between tradition and modernization.

The Museum for the Macedonian Struggle and the Research Centre for Macedonian History and Documentation (KEMIT) are run by a special institution, the homonymous Foundation.

The history of the building

The building which today houses the Museum for the Macedonian Struggle was from 1894 to 1912 Greece's Consulate-General at Salonica. It was erected on ground belonging to the Salonica Inspectorate of Greek Teaching Establishments, right next to the Bishop's Palace, after the great fire of August 23, 1890, which had destroyed the south-eastern quarters of Thessaloniki.



Among the losses was the humble residence that till then housed the Consulate General of Greece, which was the property of the Greek Orthodox Community of Thessaloniki. With the insurance money, the donation of the benefactor Andreas Syngros and the financial help offered by the Hellenic government, a sufficient amount was collected to reconstruct the buildings of the Greek community. Among them this magnificent neoclassical residence to plans drawn up by the architect Ernst Ziller, appropriate for a consular mansion. Renting of the building by the Greek state began in March 1894.

In May 1904, with the arrival of Lambros Koromilas as Greece's Consul General at Salonica, the consulate building became the nerve-centre of the struggle of Hellenism in Central Macedonia against the Bulgarians. Besides Koromilas and the diplomats, who in-

cluded two successors of Koromilas (Kontogouris, the consulate's director, and Papadiamantopoulos, its consul-general), there was a fair number of military personnel. The first of them to arrive were Ioannis Avrasoglou, Athanasios Exadaktylos, Dimitrios Kakkavos, Konstantinos Mazarakis, Mihail Moraitis, and Spyridon Spyromilios. They were followed by Andreas Kourouklis, Alexandros Mazarakis, Georgios Mastrapas, Alkiviadis Moskhonios, Alexandros Othonaios, and Kyriakos Tavoularis. These army officers worked at the consulate, under an assumed name, as "special clerks", for various lengths of time, from May 1904 to June 1909. It was they who organized the struggle, and to do this they had to go on regular tours of inspection to various areas of Macedonia.



The Consul-General's Office (reconstruction).

Consulate was being used to shield guerillas and help them escape to Greek territory. In early may 1905 this did very nearly happen, we are told in Kakkavos' *Memoirs*. The band from Crete led by Ioannis Dafotis had been in an engagement with the Turkish army, at the Agia Anastasia monastery near Vasilika, and it was necessary to get several of the men back to Greece. With two of the guerillas hiding out in the basement of the building, a Greek-speaking Turkish-Cretan was sent to the Consulate by the Turkish police to declare that he was one of Dafotis' band and needed protection. Fortunately, the officers saw through the

Then there were the many Patriarchists from towns and villages, coming to the Consulate to ask for assistance and guidance, or to pass on information. Quite a number of photographs of them were taken by the employees (mainly by Kakkavos) either inside the Consulate or outside. Christian Ottoman subjects who visited the Consulate were taking a considerable risk, for close by the building were two Turkish police posts to keep an eye on who went in. This was a problem; but it was solved by using the adjacent Bishop's Palace with the Gregory Palamas chapel in its yard. Through a little gate in the party wall, those who so wished could go unobserved from the Bishop's Yard to the yard of the Consulate.

At other times the Consulate building was a "safe house" for fighters who were under pursuit. Such was the case with Tellos Agapinos ("Captain Agras"), accommodated in the Consulate when wounded in the arm and needing hospital treatment, after an engagement with the Bulgarians on November 14, 1906. There was of course a great risk that the Ottoman authorities might find out that the

trap and sent the “spy” away, with a strongly-worded protest about this ruse to the Turkish policemen in the neighbouring post.

In Salonica, centre of Macedonia’s administrative and military authorities, the Consulate’s multifarious missions could be achieved only by ingenuity, imagination, and daring. Koromilas seems to have had all three. Late in 1905 he arranged for two officers, chieftain Georgios Kakoulidis (“Captain Dragas”) and chieftain Christos Tsolakopoulos (“Captain Rembelos”), to be smuggled back to Greece. It so happened that the First Secretary at the Consulate was going on leave, on an Italian steamship bound for the Piraeus. Koromilas invited the entire staff of the Consulate for a get-together at the Olympos Hotel, close to the quay. Among them were the two chieftains, who managed to go aboard unobserved.

The Ottoman authorities were particularly irritated by Koromilas’ actions, as effective as they were undisguised, and at the end of 1906 they demanded that he be removed from his post. The result was that in 1907 he found himself directing the Struggle from Athens.

The Consulate was at the same time an information-gathering centre. The information in question was worked on by the staff -the army officers and the diplomats- in order to rough out a course of action for the Greek camp. Letters from the heads of the various different regional centres of the Struggle were dispatched, using railway officials, to Salonica; they were then taken from the station to the Consulate, sometimes by children, to avert suspicion.

That a diplomat or an army officer was at the Consulate did not mean that he was out of the firing line. He might even go in danger of his life, for he would constantly be in the cross-sights of the Ottoman, and still more of the Bulgarian camp. Early in 1908 there was a meeting at the Bulgarian Agency (Consulate), at which it was decided to assassinate one of three people: Exadaktylos, Kakkavos, or the First Interpreter at the Greek Consulate, Theodoros Askitis. Eventually it was Askitis who was assassinated, on February 22, 1908, no more than two hundred yards away from the Consulate. The Greek camp hit back through the “Thessaloniki Organization”, which attempted to assassinate one of the most respected Bulgarian notables of Salonica, Hadzhimichev, Interpreter at the Russian Consulate, and with him Todorov, the Interpreter at the Bulgarian Agency.

Nor did the Consulate’s involvement with national disputes cease with the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, when the guerilla bands were dissolved and large-scale armed conflict stopped. The Greek side, in contrast to the Bulgarian side, continued its activity even under the new dispensation. This provoked strong displeasure among the Young Turks, and in June 1909 all the remaining consular officers were recalled to Athens, having been accused by the authorities of stirring up the embers of the quarrel between



Military uniforms of Admiral John Demestichas and Athanasios Souliotis.

Patriarchate and Exarchate. The Consulate did of course continue to support and protect Hellenism in Macedonia until Liberation in 1912.

The Balkan Wars brought victory to the Greeks and led to the union of Macedonia with the Hellenic national territory. Since the consular service was no longer required, the building was thereafter utilized for other purposes. In 1915, the Agricultural Bank of Macedonia operated on its ground-floor and basement. In 1917, for a period of three years, it provided temporary accommodation to the National Bank of Greece until its branch, which was destroyed in the great fire that struck the city that same year, could be rebuilt. In 1923, the 23rd Primary School was housed in the building. During the German Occupation (1941-1944), the Red Cross distributed food in the basement and for a few



months at the end of the Civil War (1949), the basement was used for the detention of political prisoners. In the decades that followed, it hosted a girls' school, a night school and, since 1970, the 43rd Primary School.

The founding of the Museum for the Macedonian Struggle

In April 1917, not long after Macedonia had been integrated into Greece, the Provisional Government of Premier Eleftherios Venizelos enacted order 2134 establishing a "Macedonian Museum", although with a much broader scope. This museum was to assemble

all the considerable archaeological finds marking the various historical and artistic periods through which Macedonia has passed, from antiquity to the end of the Ottoman era.

The process of creating the museum was continued in the 1940s by the Macedonian Fraternal Association for Education, while after 1950 the initiative passed to a group of private individuals, prominent public figures and descendants of the celebrated *Makedonomachoi*.

After the 1978 earthquake, which caused considerable damage to its neo-classical mansion, the building was restored and given to the “Friends of the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle” as a repository for all manner of relics and material documenting Northern Greece’s modern history.

Since 1999 the Museum has been run by the “Foundation for the Museum for the Macedonian Struggle”, which initiated, in addition to the Museum’s exhibition and



publishing activities, new educational programmes and workshops and technologically innovative applications.

The Research Centre for Macedonian History and Documentation (KEMIT)

The Research Centre for Macedonian History and Documentation (KEMIT) maintains a specialised library and electronic databases, collects and processes archival material, publishes monographs and studies, organises seminars and conferences, provides

information and documentation to interested parties and in general promotes the academic objectives of the Foundation through all possible means.

Specifically, KEMIT has amassed a huge amount of archival material concerning the period 1800–1912. The material consists of private archives and copies of diplomatic correspondence between Greek, British, United States, French and Austro-Hungarian consulates in Macedonia, all of which has been catalogued into the Museum's databases and is available to researchers. Moreover, its archive contains private documents and personal archives of Macedonian fighters and other similar collections, as well as a fully documented collection of 5,000 photographs.



KEMIT's databases are continually updated and include material pertaining to various thematic areas such as: archival material and bibliography for 2,500 towns and villages of Macedonia, demographic data and detailed election results for the periods 1900–1981 and 1928–1985 respectively, information about post-WWII migrants from Macedonia who were handled by the International Migration Organization, records of the victims of all fractions from the period 1903–1908 etc. Finally, KEMIT maintains a rich bibliography pertaining to the history of modern and contemporary Macedonia, comprising 12,500 titles. Hundreds of researchers have been served by KEMIT over the years. In addition, KEMIT also offers internships and practical training to university students.

The fundamental priority of the Museum is to serve visitors and researchers. The library and archives are open to the public every day, but archival research requires a permit, as does the copying of photographic or documentary material. Archival material may also be subject to further restrictions, depending on the specific unit.

Computer databases are available for searching information about the “Struggle for Macedonia”, the area it covered and the people who were involved in it.

The Research Centre for Macedonian History and Documentation (KEMIT) is overseen by an Academic Committee.

The exhibition

The Museum presents the modern and contemporary history of Macedonia and the movements for its integration into the Hellenic State. Emphasis is placed on the period of the “Macedonian Struggle” (1903-1908). This was an irregular warfare fought mainly between Greeks and Bulgarians in what was at the time a part of the Ottoman Empire. Both sides were vying to strengthen their hold in the region in anticipation of the expected collapse of the Ottoman domination. Nonetheless, the “Macedonian Struggle” was the last chapter of a long historical process, i.e. the Greek insurrections, mainly since the Revolution of 1821-1828, aiming to unite the “unredeemed” Greek inhabited regions of the Ottoman Empire in a modern Hellenic state. In Macedonia this process was concluded with the Balkan wars of 1912–1913. Finally, the peace treaty of Bucharest (August 1913)

officially put an end to five hundred years of Ottoman rule in the historical region of Macedonia.

For the Greek Macedonians, and, indeed, for the Hellenes at large, the “Struggle for Macedonia” has come to symbolize not only a century long struggle for freedom, but also the survival and revival of a cultural heritage traced back to a period of over two millennia. The Museum’s collection is show presented in seven halls on the ground floor. More specifically is presented in:



Sacerdotal relics, weapons and Macedonomachos' costume in Hall E, dedicated to the Armed Struggle.



View of Hall F.

Hall A Armed Struggles for freedom. 19th century Greek insurrectionary movements in Macedonia.

Hall B Macedonian society at the turn of the 19th century.

Hall C The Consul-General's Office (reconstruction).

Hall D Characteristics of the Struggle. The recruiting of the Greek bands.

Hall E The struggle in towns and villages. Special features of the Greek Struggle in town and countryside; the role of the clergy.

Hall F The end of the armed Macedonian struggle. The Balkan Wars and the incorporation into the Hellenic state.

Hall G Hellenic Macedonia in the 20th century. From the end of the Balkan Wars to the present.

In the multi-purpose hall on the first floor temporary exhibitions are hosted and also documentary films are presented.

In the basement there are life-size 3-D models of scenes from the Struggle.



Transporting ammunition (Diorama).



A Greek school (Diorama, detail).

Educational Activities

Thessaloniki: Metamorphoses of a city

The modern history of Thessaloniki unfolds in front of the children's eyes through dramatizations, games and challenges. The children have the chance to become acquainted with the city's past, to become familiar with its transition from a city which was part of an empire to the co-capital of a nation state, to examine the ideas of multiculturalism and to interact with the smells, the sounds and the stories of the city through its monuments, to which they supply their own narratives.

Deciphering the Macedonian Struggle

Hidden messages and well kept secrets await deciphering. Kids use their imagination and logical skills to discover the secretive nature of the Macedonian Struggle through an exciting game of cryptograms!

Travelling through time on a quill and a... mouse!

Since 2004 the Museum's Research Centre for Macedonian History and Documentation (KEMIT) has been running an educational programme entitled "Travelling through time on a quill and a... mouse!" The programme was designed to allow teachers and pupils to make use of the fifteen years of systematic research work that has been carried out by the Museum and its database of historical information (political, electoral, demographic, social, economic and educational) on Macedonia's communities.




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

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2012

Nikis

2011

The Greek Navy in the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913

2009

The Black '97

2008

The long march towards freedom

2007

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2006

Children in the early 20th-century Macedonia

2005

Macedonian society in the early 20th century

2004

Album of photographs: Schools of the Macedonian Struggle



A review of ICG's report *"Macedonia's Name: Breaking the Deadlock"*

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1.0 Analysis

The Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) has recently issued a new report on the so-called "name dispute" between Athens and Skopje.¹ Its alleged primary aim was to provide a set of proposals for the two parties involved to reach an agreement, thus paving the way for "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) to join NATO and eventually the EU.

Its reasoning was based on the assumption that the acceptance of its proposals will help avert the destabilization of the region; will compensate the Slav Macedonians for concessions to which they were coerced to make to the Albanian Macedonians; and, finally, will honor promises to Skopje (mainly by the Bush Administration) for entering NATO and eventually the EU.

To construct their arguments, the authors of the report attempted to meet at some point certain Greek arguments and grievances. They criticized certain attitudes and actions emanating from Skopje which offend Greek sensitivities mainly over historical and identity issues; acknowledged the overwhelming Greek public support to current Greek government positions; and concluded by proposing, the "Republic of North Macedonia", as a suitable name for international usage: a name that, under certain conditions, the Greek Government might be willing to consider. A basic prerequisite for Athens, however, was and remains valid that the agreed name should apply "erga omnes", i.e. for all purposes, by all.

At the same time, the authors offered to the other side a set of exclusions to the use of this name, which are likely, in the long run, to render the "international" name obsolete, similar to the currently focalized, temporary name of "FYROM". Moreover, the authors adopted Skopje's escalating arguments that the resolution of the problem with the country's name should also take into consideration and adopt the derivatives of Macedonia –i.e. "Macedonian" language, ethnicity, products etc.- without any suffix, prefix or compound of terms. In the view of the ICG authors, compromise on these issues on the part of Skopje was "out of the question".

Going carefully through the report, one remains with the impression that its authors are shying away from tackling the core of the problem. Their concern is to provide a semblance of a balanced proposal simply in order to encourage international "actors" to re-

¹ ICG, *Macedonia's Name: Breaking the Deadlock*, Europe Briefing No. 52, Pristina/Brussels, 12 Jan. 2009. This was preceded by seven years by another report, *Macedonia's Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It*, Europe Report No. 122, Skopje/Brussels, 10 Dec. 2001.

verse the Bucharest unanimous decision of NATO leaders² and open the way for moving with FYROM's candidacy in the EU.

Apart from the new state name, the proposal aims at "rebuilding" trust on the basis of three guidelines:

(a) Skopje should "desist from moves... offending Greek sensitivities about the Hellenic heritage".

(b) Both sides should examine treatment of their "common history of the region from ancient (sic) times to modern times".

(c) Pending an agreement on the name, Skopje should use the provisional name [FYROM] in multilateral forums and, in response, Greece should "drop its threat to veto Macedonia's membership of NATO and accession negotiations with the EU".

With trust restored, the international actors should apply "pressure" on the two parties, "especially Greece", in order to retreat from its alleged "maximal" positions.

2.0 Comments

The ICG has been known for its well researched reports over the years. The current one, however, despite the efforts of the contributors, reveals certain serious lacunae. Originating from its headquarters in Pristina, it reveals a solid appreciation of the Albanian factor in shaping Skopje's priorities. Nevertheless, on the "name issue" with Greece, the argument of regional instability of the early years of this decade is hardly a convincing one. Lack of sufficient and dependable information from inside Greece has compelled the authors to rely on third parties or observers in order to assess major changes that have occurred over the last decade in Greek perceptions of the problem. To summarize these perceptions:

- The official Greek position in no way can be viewed today as a "maximal" one. With considerable cost, political elites in the country have overrun public feelings about the use of the Macedonian name by the neighboring country. The Greek government, as well as all major parties, favor a compound geographical name for their neighbour country, provided its state name clearly defines Macedonian regions within its jurisdiction. The current constitutional name, however, "Macedonia", is identical with the name of the wider geographic region "Macedonia". Of this region, 52% is Greek territory, 9% Bulgarian and 1,5% Albanian. UN negotiator, Matthew Nimetz, has apparently realized that such a tautology of the names for two different geographical regions could become a harbinger for expansionist claims. His latest proposal, "North Macedonia", although tentatively might provide a way out of the current impasse, certainly is not a perfect one, as it might convey the impression of a divided country. In this reviewer's opinion, the parties should accept the name used by the inhabitants of FYROM for their region of geographical Macedonia i.e. "*Vardar Macedonia*", or preferably "*Vardar Makedonija*".

² The NATO decision passed in April 2008, with President Bush consenting, provided that an invitation to Skopje "will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached".

- The second development was the disappointment of the Greeks over the course of the negotiations following the signing of the 1995 Interim Accord which regulated their mutual relations, minus the differences over the name. In their view, despite the fact that they extended a generous helping hand to the Slav Macedonians (economic, political, diplomatic and even military) during the 10-year duration of Accord, Skopje failed to contribute in finding a mutually acceptable solution to the “name issue”.³ On the contrary, overlooking the letter and spirit of the 1993 UN Security Council resolution⁴, it lobbied hard to secure bilateral recognition of its constitutional name by a considerable number of states, aiming to render the UN resolution obsolete.
- The third, an even more disturbing development to Greek public opinion, particularly to the Greek Macedonians, was a re-appraisal of the ethnogenetic dogma of the “Macedonian” ethnicity. In their view, the state controlled educational system in FYROM, by extending the historical roots of the new nation to classical antiquity, was encroaching upon an illustrious past which had been recorded in the annals of Hellenic heritage, almost a millennium prior to the arrival of Slavic tribes in the region. Moreover, by claiming the entire geographic Macedonian region of modern times as their “tatkovina” (fatherland), they laid claim to everything *Macedonian*. As a result, the new generation of children, graduating from schools since the emergence of an independent Macedonian state, in 1991, have espoused the new dogma, which their over 45-year old elders, are at a loss to comprehend.⁵

With the emergence of a new generation of politicians in Skopje, belonging to the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party, some of them, with family roots in Greek Macedonia, resurfaced issues and grievances dating back to the Greek Civil War of 1945-1949, apparently claiming restitution for family sufferings. For the past two decades, the Greeks have managed to mend fences of their savage fratricidal war. Nevertheless, in FYROM, third generation descendants of the so-called “Egejski” refugees, including the current Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, attempt to rekindle the travails of that period. The Greeks are certainly aware of the role of Tito’s Yugoslavia, and more so of the nationalists of Skopje at the time, in fanning the armed conflict in Greece, aspiring in the vain to profit for themselves. By now, it is well known that the price for the Yugoslav support to the Greek communist insurrection at that time was Greek Macedonia. To reopen old wounds, on both sides of the border, in the midst of negotiations over the “name issue” would hardly be productive.

³ Consult, Ev. Kofos - Vl. Vlasidis (eds), *Athens-Skopje, An Uneasy Symbiosis (1995-2002)*, Thessaloniki-Athens: Museum for Macedonian Struggle Foundation and ELIAMEP, 2004/5.

⁴ Res. UN S/RES817/1993 stressed that the difference over the name of the state “needs to be resolved in the interest of maintaining peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in the region”.

⁵ Former President Kiro Gligorov was categorical that the present Makedontsi are descendants of the first Slavic tribes which reached the region after the 6th century AD. A few years ago, cabinet ministers in Skopje, in interviews with this writer, were complaining that they could not communicate with their teenage children, who insisted that “they were descendants of Alexander the Great”.

3. Concluding remarks

To paraphrase slightly the ICG report, it is evident, that no matter how “mystifying the dispute to outsiders” -with partial knowledge of the issue- it touches “existential nerves” in both Macedonias: the independent state, i.e. “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, and the region of “Greek Macedonia” of the Hellenic Republic.

In the opinion of this reviewer, to resolve the dispute one has to approach with a constructive spirit the “existential” elements of both parties. It is evident that the dispute is not simply the state name of Greece’s neighbour; it is what is conveyed through it.

Skopje -and third parties offering their services for a compromise solution- need to understand that the geographical region of Macedonia, which includes the entire province of “Greek Macedonia”, is not and cannot be considered the “tatkovina” (fatherland) of the *Makedonski* people living in FYROM. **This is a red line for Greece and the Greeks.**

Similarly, Slav Macedonians should realize that their newly conceived ethnogenetic dogma, extending to classical antiquity, encroaches upon the Hellenic cultural heritage and the identity of their Greek neighbours to the south.⁶ As such, it threatens to **ignite a clash of identities** in the region as a whole.

The use of the Macedonian name as a state appellation in no way confers the right to appropriate everything and anything derived from or pertained to the entire region of Macedonia. This needs **to be legally clarified and remain binding erga omnes.**

The task ahead is the search for enduring solutions to outstanding issues; otherwise, typical “diplomatic” escape clauses would bequest the problem to future generations.

Consequently, the following summary proposals might complement the ICG report:

- The state name needs specifically to refer and describe to the region of FYROM (see p.1), to apply *erga omnes*, in multilateral and bilateral international relations and transactions, by all organizations, states, and other non-governmental international organizations, including the government and the agencies of FYROM.
- Its derivatives should follow the agreed state name. State identity cards, passports etc. would inscribe the citizenship in accordance to the state name.

On issues touching upon the self-identification of persons, which includes their ethnicity, this reviewer holds the opinion that their right to self-identify themselves should be respected. This means that their name, *Makedontsi*, by which they identify themselves in their language, should be respected in all foreign languages, including the Greek. A similar arrangement might apply to the use of *Makedones* for the Greek Macedonians.

⁶ Over 90% of the ancient Macedonian Kingdom at King Philip’s time is located within the present province of Greek Macedonia, including the ancient capitals of Aegae and Pella.



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